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Introduction
This thesis comprises three essays on determinants and consequences of international
labor migration at individual, family and country level.
The first chapter explores the effect of parents’ absence due to migration on the edu-
cational outcomes of children remaining in the home country. The reduced form model
estimated in this paper relies on an educational production function where the total ef-
fect of migration is the combination of a positive effect, coming from remittances, and
a negative effect, coming from a parent’s absence. The results suggest that parental ab-
sence offsets the positive impact of remittances on children’s schooling achievements and
that a mother’s absence is more detrimental than a father’s absence, especially for girls
experiencing a mother’s migration during adolescence.
The second chapter examines the effects of family size and demographic structure on
offspring’s international migration. Exploiting a data set containing detailed information
on fertility histories, the potential endogeneity of parental fertility choices is addressed by
using infertility shocks and miscarriage before first birth as exogenous variation in family
size. There is no evidence that high fertility drives migration. The positive correlation
between fertility and migration disappears when the potential endogeneity of sibship size
is addressed. On the other hand, a deeper analysis on the birth order and the gender
composition of siblings reveals that the chances to migrate are not equally distributed
across children within the same family. Older siblings, especially firstborn males, are
more likely to migrate, while having more sisters than brothers may increase the chances
of migration, particularly among girls.
The third chapter studies the effect of granting the right to vote in local elections to
non citizens of non Eu origin1. The introduction of a new law is exploited as a natural
experiment and two sources of variation are used in order to identify the effect of the new
law: the first is time variation coming from the introduction of the reform; the second
1This is a work in progress and results discussed below must be intended as preliminary.
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9source of variation is cross-sectional and arises from the differences in municipalities’
share of new voters. In the spirit of a differences-in-differences strategy, election results
of municipalities with more immigrants entitled to vote are compared with municipalities
with a smaller share of immigrant voters (intensity of the treatment), before and after the
reform. Preliminary results indicate that, depending on the economic and demographic
context, and on the immigration policies, the effect of enfranchising non citizens from a
different ethnic group can vary substantially: the pro immigrants parties can either gain
on lose votes, with relevant consequences for public good expenditures.
Chapter 1
All you need is love...
The effect of a mother’s or father’s
migration on the education of children left
behind
1.1 Introduction
During the last thirty years, an increasing share of women has started to migrate alone
in order to pursue better economic conditions rather than to join other family members,
thus leaving part of the family, including children, back at home (Oishi, 2002; Pedraza,
1991). This paper aims at providing causal estimates of the effects of parental migration
on the educational outcomes of children left behind and addresses the heterogeneity of
the effects driven by the gender of the migrant spouse.
The economic literature emphasizes that a mother’s and father’s inputs affect differ-
ently the production function of children’s outcomes. On the one hand, it is well estab-
lished that income and assets managed by women have a higher impact on children’s
health with respect to income managed by men (Duflo, 2003; Thomas, 1990, 1994). The
evaluation of aid programs targeting women as income recipients shows significant im-
provements in children’s health and education (e.g. Gertler et al., 2001; Schultz, 2000, on
the evaluation of Progresa in Mexico). On the other hand, studies on the determinants
of children’s education stress that a mother’s human capital is more closely related to
children’s attainment than the father’s, and that maternal child care time significantly
increases a child’s completed years of education, especially if mothers are highly educated
(Datcher-Loury, 1988).
Only recently, the economic literature has started to include gender in migration re-
10
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search (Cortes, 2015; Docquier et al., 2012; Morrison et al., 2007, among others). However,
the so called ‘feminization of migration’ is not a new phenomenon (Jolly et al., 2005), and
according to UN figures1 women represented half of the migrant population already back
in the 90s. Studying female international migration and assessing the differences to the
male migration is essential to deeply understand the consequences for economic develop-
ment of the sending countries.
This paper relies on Mexican households data, taken from the 1992 and 1997 cross
sections of the Encuesta Nacional de la Dina´mica Demogra´fica (ENADID). The ratio of
women moving from Mexico to the United States increases over time, reaching its maxi-
mum in the middle of 90s, when women represented the 57% of Mexican legal migrants
Cerrutti and Massey (2001b). Even if women are less likely than men to migrate to work
in the United States, Cerrutti and Massey (2001b) find that the determinants of female
migration change through the generations, suggesting common labor force motivations
for the international migration of both younger men and women.
Following Antman (2012b)’s identification strategy, the problem of households selec-
tion into migration is overcome by exploiting a family fixed effect strategy and comparing
children suffering mother’s or father’s absence at different stages of their educational ca-
reer. Such a strategy addresses the ‘double’ selection which arises in the framework of this
paper: on the one hand, migrant families differ fundamentally from non-migrant families;
on the other, households in which the mother migrates can also systematically differ from
those in which the father migrates.
The main results show that the gender of the migrant spouse and the timing of mi-
gration, relative to the child’s educational progress, are both relevant. The absence of a
parent due to migration has a negative effect on the children’s years of completed school-
ing; moreover, a mother’s absence is more detrimental than is a father’s absence, especially
for girls. These results help to shed light on the sign of the causal effect of parental mi-
gration on education, given that the total effect is theoretically ambiguous and that also
the available empirical evidence is mixed. There are, in fact, at least two main channels,
working in opposite directions, that determine the total effect of migration on education:
remittances from abroad, which should positively affect children’s schooling; and parental
absence from home, the ‘love’ component, which is instead expected to have a negative
impact on children’s attainment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant
1Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2008 Revision, United Nation - Population Division.
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literature; Section 3 describes the details of the empirical strategy; Section 4 presents
data and descriptive statistics; Section 5 illustrated the results, Section 6 provides the
robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper relates to two different strands of the literature: the first one studies the effect
of a household member’s migration on the outcomes of children left behind; while the
second focuses on the determinants of education, in terms of parental investment in time
and income.
Migration is an investment often made to improve families’ welfare (Kennan and
Walker, 2011a; Chen et al., 2003a). The individual who migrates is expected to earn
more in the destination country than at home, and the remittances from abroad should
improve children’s left behind outcomes by relaxing the household budget constraint.
However, the total effect on children is controversial, given that migration may impose
a psychological cost to children, due to the absence of the migrant parent. A parent’s
migration can also have a negative impact on children outcomes, balancing the positive
effect of remittances.
The total effect of parental migration on children education is then ambiguous and it
remains an empirical question. The existing evidence is mixed and provides statistically
significant estimates of both a positive and negative sign.
Hanson and Woodruff (2003) find a positive effect of living in a household with external
migrants by focusing on Mexico. The effect is significant only for girls whose parents
have a low level of education. However, in the same context, McKenzie and Rapoport
(2011) find a negative effect of living in a migrant household on schooling attendance and
attainments for boys aged 12-18 years and girls aged 16-18 years, as a consequence of
increased housework for girls and of increased migration to the United States for boys.
By specifically focusing on paternal migration, Antman (2011a) finds that a father’s
migration from Mexico to the United States has a negative impact on educational out-
comes of children staying at home. More specifically, the results on children’s time use
data suggest a negative short-term effect on hours devoted to study in the period following
paternal migration and an increase in work hours of boys aged 12-15 years. A different re-
sults is reached by Antman (2012b) who estimates a positive effect of a father’s migration
to the USA on daughter’s completed schooling in Mexico.
There are also few works studying the effect coming from remittances only, without
accounting for the effect driven by the absence of the migrant household member. Bansak
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and Chezum (2009) and Edwards and Ureta (2003) find, respectively, that remittances
from abroad have a positive effect on school attendance for school-age children in Nepal,
and a significant impact on school retention in El Salvador. Given the lack of data, there
is not much evidence on remitting behavior by gender. In general, since women are more
likely to earn less in the host country, one may expect they remit less in absolute value.
With regard to Mexico, Massey and Basem (1992) find evidence that men remit relatively
more than women, that is a larger portion of their wage. The same results hold also in a
larger area, i.e. Latin America and the Carribbean (Orozco, 2006).
Concerning the literature on the determinants of education, there is evidence that
gender matters for explaining children attainments as a result of parental investment
in time and income (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995, is a good reference for a complete
review of the methods and findings on children’s attainment). This literature shows that
children growing up in single-parent households (not only as a result of migration) suffer
from disadvantages, including poor school performance. Lyle (2006) analyzes the impact
of parental absence and household relocation on children’s academic achievements, by
exploiting military deployment in the United States. The main results about parental
absence show that the absence of the mother has a more adverse effect then the absence
of the father. Chen et al. (2009) study the impact of parental death on children’s education
by using data on Taiwan. They find that losing a father has a very small and insignificant
effect on children’s college attainment, irrespective of the cause of death. Losing a mother
causes instead a significant decrease in college enrollment, whatever the reason of the
unexpected death. The authors interpret these findings as evidence of the fact that
maternal roles, in terms of non financial support, are no less important than the provision
of financial support in shaping children’s cognitive ability.
In addition to the direct impact on children’s outcomes, the absence of a spouse
can also determine the change of spousal control over the intra-household allocation of
resources. By exploiting changes in the household environment as a consequence of migra-
tion, Antman (2011b) finds evidence of increased women’s decision making power and of
increased gender discrimination among children while the husband is away. The fraction
of clothing expenditure spent on boys decreases while the Mexican father is in the United
States and increases in families in which the father is already back.
The results of Antman (2011b) suggest that the gender of the migrant and the resulting
change in the decision making power over household allocations play crucial roles in
determining the investment in the children remaining at home with the non-migrant
spouse. However, the heterogeneity driven by the gender of the migrant is an issue
not addressed by most of the previous works. One exception is the recent paper by
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Cortes (2015), who explores the effect of a mother’s migration on children’s wellbeing in
the Philippines. She compares children of migrating mothers with children of migrating
fathers, by using an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, she uses economic shocks
and changes in immigration laws in the destination countries as a random source of
variation of migration rates. The probability of lagging behind (taking a value of one
when the child has dropped out of school or is enrolled in a lower level than expected at
her age) is used as the dependent variable. The results show that a mother’s migration
increases by 35% the probability that a child is lagging behind in school. The author
interprets the results as evidence that the effect is mainly driven by lower parental inputs,
rather than by fewer remittances (given that the same results persist when controlling for
remittances).
There are two main aspects that differentiate this paper with respect to Cortes (2015).
The first difference is in the outcome variable: she looks at the probability of lagging
behind, which is a contemporaneous outcome with respect to a parent’s migration; the
focus of this paper is instead on completed education, as measured even many year after
the experience of a parent’s migration, i.e. a long run measure of children’s achievements.
The second different concerns with the identification strategy: while she relies on an IV
strategy, in this paper a family fixed effects is adopted. More specifically, the time at
which children experience a parent’s absence is exploited in order to assess the impact
of migration on their educational outcomes. This study tries to assess how decisions on
schooling investments, at any given level, respond to changes in income, due to remittances
coming from abroad, and to changes in time parents spend with their children.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical specification used throughout this paper exploits the different times of the
educational career during which each sibling experiences a parental absence because of
migration to the United States. Three crucial moments in the children’s educational ca-
reer are defined, each corresponding to the entrance to a new level of schooling. The
empirical model captures these crucial moments through the creation of a series of dum-
mies taking a value of one if the child experiences parental absence when she is 6-7 years
old (corresponding to the moment in which decisions on entering primary education must
be taken), 12-13 years old (the decision on entering secondary education) or 15-16 years
old (the decision on entering upper secondary education).
The empirical strategy is inspired by Antman (2012b), however the main hypothesis
on which the two papers rely is different. In Antman (2012b), the basic assumption is
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that schooling of children suffering migration after turning 20 years old is not affected by
a father’s being in the United States. The results she finds can be affected by a birth
order effect, given that, by construction, only later born siblings are affected by a father’s
migration. In contrast, the identification strategy used in this paper does not generate
any systematic relations between a parent’s migration and the birth order of the children,
because it exploits migration episodes at different moments of each child’s educational
career.
The underlying assumption that household decisions on investment in education, made
at the beginning of each level, will affect the attainment of the entire level is confirmed
by the statistics reported in Table 1.1 about the schooling attainment in Mexico for the
schooling years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002, computed at a national level.
The takeover index is defined as the percentage of pupils of a cohort enrolls in a specific
level who also enrolls in the next schooling level. More in details, this indicator shows
that there is high continuity between primary and secondary school and that more than
90% of pupils completing primary school enroll also in secondary school.
The drop-out index indicates the percentage of pupils who abandon school before
completing the specific educational level: only 2% of pupils abandon primary school
before completion, while about 7% and 16% of pupils abandon secondary and upper
secondary school before completion. The second index, eficiencia terminal, is defined as
the percentage of pupils who manage to complete each educational level during the n
years devoted to that specify level, that is, with no delay or repetition. This value is
high especially for primary and secondary schools (almost 90 and 80% respectively). The
two indicators show that the abandon rate is low (especially for primary and secondary
schools) and a high percentage of pupils manage to complete each school level on time.
Given the above evidence, it is reasonable to assume that the schooling attainment, as
measured by the years of completed education, of children who suffered parental absence
outside of the critical ages defined above, is not affected by a parental migration expe-
rience. However, this assumption does not imply that parental absence does not affect
other educational outcomes, for example, grades.
The following equation should be estimated in order to assess the impact of parental
migration on children’s education:
Y ears of schoolingi = α+β1primaryi + β2secondaryi+
+ β3upper secondaryi + β4Xi + vi
(1.1)
The dependent variable is the number of years of schooling that child i has completed
16
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by the time of the survey. The coefficients of interest are the ones for a mother’s or
father’s migration at any stage (primary, secondary and upper secondary education),
namely β1, β2 and β3. The list of controls includes age, age squared and gender of each
child, birth order dummies and a dummy for school attendance at the time of the survey.
In 1992, the Secretariat of Public Education officially increased compulsory education
from completion of primary school (grade six) to completion of lower secondary school
(grade nine). A dummy for the reform is included in the controls. vi is the idiosyncratic
component.
One issue with the specification in equation (1.1) concerns the selection into migration,
which can bias OLS estimates of the parameters β1, β2 and β3, given the heterogeneity
between migrant and non-migrant households. In this paper, the use of a family fixed
effect strategy overcomes the problem of selection into migration, by comparing children’s
educational outcomes within the same family.
A family fixed effect is added to equation (1) and the following equation is estimated:
Y ears of schoolingi = α+β1primaryi + β2secondaryi+
β3upper secondaryi + β4Xi + uf + vi
(1.2)
In equation (1.2) the coefficients β1, β2 and β3 refer to the effects of a mother or father’s
absence. In order to shed light on the heterogeneity of the effects driven by the gender
of the migrant spouse, the regressors are split according to the gender of the migrating
parent and the following equation is estimated:
Y ears of schoolingif = α +
∑
p
β1pprimaryifp +
∑
p
β2psecondaryifp+
+
∑
p
β3pupper secondaryifp + β4Xif + uf + vif , p = father,mother
(1.3)
Previous literature mainly relies on the IV approach to overcome the problem of the
endogeneity of migration. Most studies use as an instrument either the historical migra-
tion rate (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011) or the labor market conditions in the country
of destination (Antman, 2011a; Cortes, 2015). However, neither set of instruments is free
from criticism concerning the validity of the exclusion restrictions.
Employment conditions in the country of destination can have a direct impact on
decisions about children’s schooling in the country of origin, especially if the economic
indicators of both countries are highly correlated. Moreover, there can be channelsother
than parental migration, through which shocks in the labor market conditions of the des-
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tination country can affect schooling at the origin (such as the employment and wage
conditions of other family members who have already migrated). When historical state-
level migration rates are used as the instrument, high migration rates can be a proxy
for higher development in the region and it can have a direct impact on current school-
ing attainment. Moreover, such an instrument can address the selectivity problem at a
household level, but is not helpful to address the issue of who migrates and for how long.
Instead, the family fixed effect strategy controls for maternal and paternal selection
into migration, given that the comparison is not between children of migrant fathers
and children of migrant mothers, but between siblings within the same family. Also the
observed and unobserved heterogeneity at a family level is controlled for, to the extent
that the heterogeneity is assumed to be constant over time.
An underlying assumption of this identification strategy is that there are no other
shocks at the family level, except for migration, that potentially affect children’s educa-
tion. The identifying assumption would be violated only if the unobserved shocks at a
family level affect children depending on their ages, exactly in the same way as migration
does (which means that only children at the beginning of a new level of schooling should
suffer or enjoy the shock).
Another critical issue relates to the measure of schooling and to the inclusion of cen-
sored observations: the observed completed years of schooling for children who are still in
school does not represent the final attainment and not taking it into account can result
in biased estimates.
Therefore, the problem of censored observations of the dependent variable is addressed
in two ways. First, the analysis focuses on children older than 16 years, because at this age
they are not expected to be enrolled in school; indeed, this is a sample for which censoring
is not a major problem (a robustness check is performed by using only children older than
19 years). Second, an age and gender-specific school index is build. The index is defined
as the difference between the schooling of the individual i of gender g of cohort c, Sigc, and
the mean schooling of her (or his) age and gender cohort, S¯gc. By using this approach,
individual schooling attainments are rescaled relative to the performance of students of the
same gender and cohort. This has the advantage of using all the observations. But, this
method does not distinguish between individuals attending school and individuals outside
of the educational process, since the information on current attendance is ignored.
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1.4 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this paper come from the 1992 and 1997 cross sections of the Encuesta
Nacional de la Dina´mica Demogra´fica (ENADID, National Survey of Demographic Dy-
namics) conducted by Mexico’s National Statistical Agency (INEGI). The ENADID is a
large survey, representative of the Mexican population, that collects personal information
on household characteristics (such as the occupants’ age, level of education, religion, job
and income), details on pregnancy of women aged 15 to 54 years as well as information
on migration. The ENADID also contains detailed information on the migration of both
thefather and mother, on the country of destination and on the time spent away.
In order to identify parental migration episodes three data sources are used: the ques-
tionnaire section on international migration, in which migration episodes up to five years
prior to the survey are registered and two questions from the section of general information
on individuals living in the household. The first question collects data on an individual’s
prior residence, including details on time and place, and the second one asks about labor
migration to the United States, again gathering details allowing reconstruction of the
timing of such episodes.
In Table 1.2, summary statistics on the original and the final sample are reported.
More than fifty thousand households were surveyed each year, and information on more
than one hundred and fifty thousands children2 within the whole country were collected.
More than half of fathers in the original sample experienced migration to the United
States, while only between four and six percent of mothers moved to the United Sates.
The final sample includes only children of migrants, in families where there are at least
two siblings, and excludes children ever migrated to the United States. The sample of
estimation is then made of more than 20,000 individuals, with 99% of them aged from six
to thirty-five years. More than 90% of children experienced paternal migration at some
point of their lives, while only about 6% suffered maternal migration.
In Panel A of Table 1.3 households with migrant mothers are compared with house-
holds with migrant fathers. As expected, the two types of families differ significantly in
many dimensions (with the exception of the fraction of female children). In families in
which the father leaves to the United States, it is more likely that the woman declares
herself to be the head of the household; both mothers and fathers in such families are
less educated and have more children. These differences do not invalidate the results:
2All daughters or sons of the head of household and her/his spouse are considered as children here.
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the strategy used here exploits variation within the family, such that all observed and
unobserved heterogeneity at the family level is cleaned away.
Table 1.3 (Panel B and C) compares migrant families with at least two children and
migrant families with an only child. Only child families are very few, but also very
different with respect to larger families. Families with only one child are, on average,
more educated and experience longer migration. One major consequence of these tests
is that the results of this study cannot be generalized to one child families, but they are
valid only for families with two or more children.
The estimates presented below use two outcome variables: one is the years of schooling
in formal education and the other is a measure of the years of schooling also including
the years attended in training or in vocational courses (training courses in what follows).
Figure 1.1 plots the two distributions separately by gender. It clearly emerges that females
are more likely than males of the same age to attend training courses. Vocational courses
are very important for girls: controlling for girls’ age, attendance at such courses results
in a higher probability of working out of the household and in a smaller probability of
doing household works.
1.5 Results
The results unambiguously suggest a negative effect of parental absence on children’s
schooling due to migration. The magnitude of the effect depends on the time and the
gender of the migrant, with mothers having a larger effect (in absolute value)3 than do
fathers. Moreover, there is evidence of heterogeneity driven by the gender of the child:
daughters are more affected than sons, both in terms of the magnitude of the effect
and because they are affected throughout their entire educational career. The effect is
not monotonic with respect to the age of children at the time of parental migration; a
mother’s migration has a U-shaped effect, reaching its highest effect during secondary
school, for both daughters and sons; a father’s migration instead has a decreasing pattern
for boys, reaching its highest effect when sons suffer his absence at the beginning of upper
secondary school and a less clear pattern for daughters.
In the tables below, Panel A reports results when only years of schooling in formal
education are used as the dependent variable, while in Panel B information on the years
of schooling acquired by attending training courses are also used. Column 1 shows the
3All coefficients of interest have a negative sign.
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results for the whole sample of children, then only girls (column 2) and only boys (column
3) are considered. Looking at the results by gender of the child is more informative about
the parental decision process underlying the results, given that parents invest differently
in the schooling of boys and girls.
Table 1.4 shows the results for the sample of all children aged 16 years and older, with
dummies for the absence of at least one parent, without distinguishing by gender. The
results in Panel A show that one parent’s absence while starting secondary school makes
girls attending half of a year of schooling less with respect to their sisters enjoying parents
at home at the same age. The effect is lower and less significant when one parent is away
at the beginning of upper secondary school. In Panel B, previous results are confirmed,
with slightly higher coefficients.
In Table 1.5 the gender of the migrant spouse is accounted for. Estimation in Panel
A column (2) suggests that both maternal and paternal migration has a detrimental
impact on years of completed schooling. Suffering maternal absence when secondary
school should start, namely at 12-13 years old, significantly reduces the schooling for girls
by more than one year with respect to their sisters enjoying the presence of the mother at
the same age. The magnitude of the effect on girls is even larger when one also considers
the attendance of training courses. In order to enroll in most of the training courses, a
student must complete secondary school. Thus, losing the opportunity to attend (and
eventually complete) secondary school (as shown in Panel A) also prevents girls from
attending a training course later on. No significant results are found for boys. At the
bottom of Panel A and B of Table 1.5, p-values of one-sided tests for a mother’s coefficients
being larger than a father’s coefficients at any stage are reported. For most specifications,
a mother’s absence has a significantly more detrimental effect on children’s education with
respect to a father’s absence. This holds for both daughters and sons and especially at
the beginning of secondary education.
The results of the family fixed effects strategy applied to the index of schooling (Table
1.6 ) support previous evidence that daughters are more affected than are sons, and
suggest that girls suffer more from maternal migration and sons from paternal migration.
The effect of parental migration on girls is never significant in Panel A (column 2), when
only years of formal education are included. A one-sided test on the coefficient of maternal
absence at 12-13 years old, however, results in the non-rejection of the null hypothesis
that such a coefficient is negative. As for previous results, a maternal absence at 12-13
years old has a highly significant and detrimental effect on girls’ years of schooling, when
training courses are also considered. The p-values at the bottom of Panel B, relative to the
test on a mother’s coefficients being larger than a father’s coefficients, suggest again that,
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at least for girls, a mother’s absence at 12-13 years old is significantly more detrimental
than a father’s absence at the same age.
The presence of parents at home, when the decision on entering a new level of schooling
must be taken, can be seen as the extensive margin effect. By exploiting information on
the duration of parental absence, it is possible to shed light on the intensive margin
effect. Duration is measured here as the years of a parent’s absence before the child turns,
respectively, 6, 12 and 15 years old. Table 1.7 and 1.8 show the results of the duration of
parental absence on the years of schooling for the sample of children older than 16 years
and on the index of schooling, respectively. The results for the sample of girls suggest
that the length of maternal absence significantly decreases education during the child’s
adolescence (in line with results on the extensive margin). While the absence of the mother
per se does not significantly affect boys’ education, the length of the absence matters also
for boys’ schooling attainment. Surprisingly, the duration of maternal absence has a very
negative effect at the beginning of boys’ education (one more year of absence results in
almost one year of schooling less for boys), while a longer absence has a positive but
smaller effect when the child has to decide on the attendance of upper secondary school.
1.5.1 Discussion of the Results
There are two main channels through which migration can affect household investment
on children’s education: remittances and time, each affecting education in an opposite
direction. Suppose that the education production function depends on two inputs: eco-
nomic resources, represented in this framework by remittances, R; and parental time, T :
E(Rp, Tp), p = parental (1.4)
The effect of parental migration, Mk, on E is then given by the following:
∂E
∂Mk
=
∂E
∂Rp
∂Rp
∂Mk
+
∂E
∂Tp
∂Tp
∂Mk
, k = father,mother (1.5)
The sign of the derivative in (1.2) is ambiguous and depends on which effect dominates;
the positive one coming from remittances or the negative one coming from absence.
Under the assumption that a dollar coming from maternal or paternal resources has the
same effect on children’s educational achievements ( ∂E
∂Rf
= ∂E
∂Rm
) and one hour invested in
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children’s education by the mother or the father has the same effect ( ∂E
∂Tf
= ∂E
∂Tm
), it seems
reasonable to expect that children experiencing a mother’s migration will suffer more with
respect to children experiencing migration of the father. This last expectation is justified
by the evidence from previous studies on the effect of remittances and time by gender of
the migrant parent, which suggests that the positive effect from remittances should be
higher when a father migrates, while the negative effect deriving from a parent’s absence
is bigger when a mother migrates4. In short:
∂E
∂Rp
∂Rp
∂Mm
<
∂E
∂Rp
∂Rp
∂Mf
and
∂E
∂Tp
∂Tp
∂Mm
>
∂E
∂Tp
∂Tp
∂Mf
, m = mother, f = father.
The empirical exercise of this paper does not disentangle the two effects of remittance
and time. However, looking at the sign of the total effect, ∂E
∂Mk
, allows us to infer that
the negative effect coming from the lack of time inputs dominates the positive effect
from remittances. Moreover, the results suggest that the negative effect is stronger when
mother migrates. Descriptive evidence shows that migrant mothers are, on average, more
educated than migrant fathers. One can then imagines that the detected effect operates
through the reduction of time spent with the most skilled parent. This conjecture is in line
with the results on the duration of a parent’s absence: the longer is a mother’s migration,
the less she can exert influence on children’s behavior and, consequently, the children will
attend less schooling.
If the simple framework above helps to explain the negative sign of the coefficients
and why, in the data, mothers’ migration is more detrimental, it provides no intuitions on
why mother’s negative coefficients are mainly significant for girls. Migration of a parent
implies that the spouse remaining at home has more decision making power on children’s
investments: if a father has higher preferences for sons, while the mother is away, he
decides to devote more resources to them. The opposite is true for the mother, who
has higher preferences for girls. Such an interpretation is consistent with other studies
showing that an increase of the woman’s bargaining power generates an increase of girls’
outcomes but not of boys’ (Duflo, 2003; Thomas, 1994).
Consistently across most of the specifications, no significant results are found for chil-
dren experiencing parental migration early in their educational career (namely when they
are 6-7 years old). Reasonably the opportunity cost of sending children to school is lower
at this stage, while as children grow up it is more valuable to make them work instead of
4Refer to Section 1.2.
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study, even to sustain the cost of a parent’s migration.
The literature identifies an additional channel through which parental migration can
influence the education of children remaining in the home country: the prospect of future
migration. According to this explanation, parents decide not to educate children since
they expect children to migrate later in life and return to education is higher in Mexico
than for Mexican individuals moving to the United States (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005).
This mechanism does not play a major role in explaining previous results since the main
effect is found for girls and descriptive statistics show that migrant women positively
select with respect to education. Moreover, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) find that
living in a migrant household increases the probability of migration for younger males,
while ‘female youth in migrant households are not that likely to migrate themselves’.
1.6 Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of the results, it is necessary to show that they are not affected by
the sample composition driven by the cut at 16 years old and not driven by the difference
in timing of the mother’s or father’s migration with respect to their children’s births.
First, in Table 1.9, the results for an alternative sample including only children aged
19 years or older are shown. This sample shows a lower average attendance rate (relaxing
the potential bias coming from comparing children still in school with children already
out) at the cost of being smaller in size. The coefficients on daughters (column 2) are
not significant and the change with respect to the coefficients for girls older than 16 is
small. This indicates that between 17 and 19 years old, girls do not acquire additional
schooling, independently of any parental migration episode they experience. A one-sided
test on the coefficient of a mother’s absence at 12-13 years old suggests we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the effect of a mother’s absence at 12-13 years old is negative. The
results on informal education, in Panel B, are fully robust to the previous results: the
absence of the mother when a daughter is aged 12-13 years results in a significant reduction
in the schooling acquired of almost three years.
Looking at the sample of boys (column 3), almost all coefficients are higher in magni-
tude with respect to the coefficients in Table 1.5. The coefficient for a mother’s absence at
12-13 years old is now also highly significant. It suggests that, differently from girls, boys
are more likely to attend a higher level of schooling after they turned 16 years old, and
that experiencing a mother’s absence when decision on entering secondary school must
be taken is crucial for enrollment in higher grades (sons experiencing a mother’s absence
at 12-13 years old have almost five years of schooling less than their brothers enjoying the
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presence of the mother at the same age).
Column 1 of Table 1.10 shows the results for a sample of children all aged 16 years or
older whose siblings are all in the household5 . Such a sample ensures that the comparison
is between all siblings and none are missing, being already out of the household for any
reason. In both Panel A and B, the result that a mother’s absence at 12-13 years old is
highly detrimental is confirmed, with coefficients slightly higher with respect to previous
specifications.
A possible threat to the identification strategy comes from the eventual correlation
between a mother’s and father’s migration and their decision on fertility: mothers, for
instance, may decide to migrate only after the births of all children, while fathers may be
more likely to migrate in between the births. This discrepancy might generate correlations
between the timing of mothers’ and fathers’ migrations and their fertility decisions. If this
was true for any household size, only first borns would have suffered a mother’s migration
later in their educational career. If a correlation between the timing and spacing of births
and migration exists, a correlation between birth order and children’s age at the time
of parental migration must also exist. First, descriptive evidence is provided in order to
show that it does not happen in this empirical study. After that, robustness checks are
run on a selected sample for which such a problem does not exist.
Figure 1.3(a) plots the average number of children born before a mother’s or father’s
migration for any given household size (on the x-axis). For families with four children or
fewer (40% of the sample), a very small difference is observed in the patterns of a mother’s
and father’s migrations. As the number of children increases, it appears more likely that
mothers migrate before giving births to all children, while fathers migrate later. However,
data clearly show that, for any household size, both parents are likely to migrate before
the births of all kids, with mothers moving earlier, especially in a large family.
Figure 1.3(b) (1.3(c)) shows the probability of experiencing a mother’s (father’s) mi-
gration at each critical threshold, that is when child is aged 6-7, 12-13 or 15-16 years.
Figure 1.3(b) suggests that, at almost any birth order (x-axis), a mother’s migration is
more likely to happen when the child is very young (6-7 years). A father’s migration at
any stage (Figure 1.3(c)) is distributed more uniformly with respect to birth order. A
mother’s and father’s time of migration do not show a systematically different pattern
with respect to the birth order of children. Then, even if there are small differences in
the timing of migration by the gender of the migrant, they do not represent a threat to
5The sample is not split by the gender of the chid because of a lack of sufficient observations.
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the validity of the proposed identification strategy.
The sample in column 2 of Table 1.10 uses all children aged 16 or older who have
no more than three siblings; that is, a sample for which there are no concerns about the
different timing of a mother’s and father’s migration. Again, in both Panel A and B, a
mother’s absence at 12-13 years old has the highest effect, while also a father’s absence at
15-16 years old has a negative effect on schooling when the attendance of training courses
is also accounted for.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper studies the impact of parental migration on the educational outcomes of
children left behind in Mexico and controls for the heterogeneity of the effect driven
by the gender of the migrant spouse.
The problem of selection into migration is overcome by exploiting a family fixed effect
strategy, which ensures that the selection bias arising from the differences between female
and male migrant households is properly taken into account.
The results unambiguously suggest a negative effect of parental absence due to mi-
gration on children schooling. The reduced form model estimated here relies on a simple
educational production function where the effect of migration is the combination of a pos-
itive effect coming from remittances and a negative effect coming from a parent’s absence.
Then, the empirical evidence suggests that a parental absence offsets the positive impact
of remittances on children’s schooling achievements. The results on the intensive margin,
i.e. the duration of a parent’s migration, are also in line with the above framework, i.e. a
longer absence of the parent who is mainly devoted to caring for their children and help-
ing them with their homework and who is more educated, namely the mother, negatively
affects children’s educational achievement, for both girls and boys.
The effect of migration on the educational attainment of the children left behind is
heterogeneous: on the one hand, maternal absence is more detrimental than paternal
absence during child adolescence; on the other hand, the timing at which the child expe-
riences parental absence plays a crucial role. Experiencing migration early in the child’s
educational career does not have a significant effect. A possible explanation for this relies
on the opportunity cost of sending the child to school: it is lower when the child is very
young and it increases as the child grows up, when she can contribute to a family’s income
by working outside the household or by participating at household occupations. In line
with this, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) find that girls in migrant households are signif-
icantly more likely to do housework than girls in non-migrant households; while Antman
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(2011a) finds that boys aged 12-15 years increase working hours and work participation
outside the home in response to a father’s migration.
The increase of migrant women in response to global changes in the labor market
raises relevant policy questions. Women are now more likely to migrate independently
and to work abroad in order to fulfil the demand for cheap female labor supply, especially
as caregivers or to perform other women’s work. This path can promote the reproduction
and exploitation of gender inequalities by reinforcing existing patterns that oppress women
and which tend to perpetuate a women’s role in the family and the society. Moreover, as
this study points out, maternal absence during child adolescence can be very detrimental
for children’s educational attainments, especially for daughters. Women’s migration can
then have a negative impact on women themselves through the perpetuation of gender
roles and also through the effect on the next generation of women.
Gender is a key element in migration and it can influence any aspect of migration:
causes, patterns and consequences. This paper shows that the gender of the migrant
spouse is an important dimension when assessing the impact of migration on the family
left behind. Incorporating gender into migration research is essential to fully understand
this phenomenon.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of years of completed schooling by age and gender
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Figure 1.2: Fertility and migration
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Table 1.1: Mexican Schooling Indicators
Drop-out Rate Eficiencia Terminal
Schooling year 2000/2001 2001/2002 2000/2001 2001/2002
Primary School 2% 2% 86% 88%
Secondary School 8% 7% 75% 78%
Upper Secondary School 17% 16% 59% 59%
Note. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa (INEGI).
Table 1.2: ENADID surveys
A. Original Sample
1992 1997 Total
Observations 284,980 362,905 647,885
Number of households 53,874 72,724 126,598
Number of children 160,365 191,033 351,398
Migrant mothers 0.040 0.063 0.053
Migrant fathers 0.547 0.709 0.639
B. Final Sample
1992 1997 Total
Number of households 2,652 4,152 6,804
Number of children 8,689 12,957 21,646
Migrant mothers 0.064 0.066 0.065
Migrant fathers 0.936 0.934 0.935
Note. Panel A: Original sample after merging survey sections; Panel B : Only households
for which either the mother or the father migrated to the United States and with at least
two children.
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Table 1.3: Tests on household characteristics
A. Migrant Mothers vs Migrant Fathers
Mean migrant mothers Mean migrant fathers P-values
Male household head 0.454 0.953 0.00
Mother’s education 7.458 6.004 0.00
Father’s education 9.124 5.933 0.00
Kid’s education 8.375 7.146 0.00
Duration of migration 5.027 3.353 0.00
Number of kids 2.380 3.230 0.00
Fraction of female 0.486 0.500 0.16
Kid’s age 13.968 12.378 0.00
Number of households 1,457 12,838
B. Migrant Mother with 2 or more Kids vs Migrant Mother with Only Child
Mean 2 or more kids Mean only 1 kid P-values
Male household head 0.559 0.493 0.06
Mother’s education 7.287 8.237 0.00
Father’s education 8.896 9.821 0.06
Kid’s education 8.211 9.114 0.02
Duration of migration 3.796 5.213 0.00
Fraction of female 0.487 0.472 0.64
Kid’s age 13.968 14.690 0.19
Number of households 706 276
C. Migrant Father with 2 or more Kids vs Migrant Father with Only Child
Mean 2 or more kids Mean only 1 kid P-values
Male household head 0.948 0.961 0.02
Mother’s education 5.924 6.939 0.00
Father’s education 5.873 6.490 0.00
Kid’s education 7.100 7.664 0.00
Duration of migration 2.675 3.507 0.00
Fraction of female 0.500 0.494 0.57
Kid’s age 12.323 13.348 0.00
Number of households 8,679 1,843
Note. Panel A: The characteristics of the households in which the mother migrates are compared with the
characteristics of the households in which the father migrates; the p-values in the last column derive from
a t-test on the equality of the mean between the two groups; Panel B (C): The characteristics of migrating
mother (father) families with two or more children are compared with the characteristics of migrating mother
(father) families with an only child. Statistics on children’s education are computed by using only children
with completed education. The duration of migration is expressed in years.
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Table 1.4: The effect of parental migration on the years of schooling of children left behind
A. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling in Formal Education Only
All children Females only Males only
(1) (2) (3)
One parent’s absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0417 0.0478 -0.0827
(0.154) (0.264) (0.227)
One parent’s absence when child is 12-13 years old -0.1812 -0.5726*** -0.1930
(0.146) (0.217) (0.250)
One parent’s absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.2540** -0.3459* -0.3349
(0.119) (0.196) (0.204)
Female 0.0677
(0.076)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 7,494 2,196 2,069
Number of Families 3,683 938 889
Average Schooling 8.286 8.359 8.300
Average Attendance Rate 0.227 0.196 0.193
R-squared 0.0527 0.0566 0.0634
B. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling including Training Courses
One parent’s absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0229 -0.1000 -0.0176
(0.158) (0.246) (0.234)
One parent’s absence when child is 12-13 years old -0.2134 -0.8690*** -0.0963
(0.155) (0.230) (0.253)
One parent’s absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.3531*** -0.5445** -0.3403
(0.125) (0.216) (0.209)
Female 0.2474***
(0.080)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 7,494 2,196 2,069
Number of Families 3,683 938 889
Average Schooling 8.554 8.767 8.473
Average Attendance Rate 0.227 0.196 0.193
R-squared 0.0552 0.0659 0.0649
Note. Only children older than 16 years old. Dependent variable: Panel A: Years of completed schooling in formal
education only; Panel B : Years of completed schooling including the attendance of training courses. Controls
include: age, age squared, birth order dummies, a dummy for attendance, a dummy for the 1992 schooling reform.
Standard errors clustered at the family level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10 % level is represented by
*, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.5: The effect of parental migration on the years of schooling of children left behind,
by the gender of the migrant
A. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling in Formal Education Only
All children Females only Males only
(1) (2) (3)
Paternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0336 0.0823 -0.0701
(0.159) (0.270) (0.231)
Maternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.2290 -0.6968 -1.4212
(0.535) (0.703) (1.002)
Paternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -0.1040 -0.5019** -0.1044
(0.148) (0.222) (0.246)
Maternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -1.5192** -1.4793** -2.7097
(0.686) (0.675) (1.876)
Paternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.2458** -0.2913 -0.3360
(0.122) (0.194) (0.209)
Maternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.2534 -0.9570 -0.3967
(0.490) (1.114) (0.768)
Female 0.0684
(0.076)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 7,494 2,196 2,069
Number of Families 3,683 938 889
Average Schooling 8.286 8.359 8.300
Average Attendance Rate 0.227 0.196 0.193
R-squared 0.0540 0.0582 0.0663
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.637 0.149 0.0944
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.0220 0.0842 0.0842
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.494 0.277 0.470
B. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling including Training Courses
Paternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0358 -0.0524 0.0183
(0.163) (0.252) (0.236)
Maternal absence when child is 6-7 years old -0.3366 -1.1896 -2.5422
(0.600) (0.930) (1.746)
Paternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -0.1122 -0.7588*** -0.0107
(0.157) (0.233) (0.251)
Maternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -1.9724*** -2.5631*** -2.6750
(0.659) (0.713) (1.761)
Paternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.3351*** -0.5095** -0.3410
(0.128) (0.215) (0.215)
Maternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.4789 -0.7007 -0.1368
(0.532) (1.087) (0.814)
Female 0.2463***
(0.080)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 7,494 2,196 2,069
Number of Families 3,683 938 889
Average Schooling 8.554 8.767 8.473
Average Attendance Rate 0.227 0.196 0.193
R-squared 0.0572 0.0687 0.0683
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.275 0.118 0.0733
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.00301 0.00809 0.0671
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.396 0.431 0.596
Note. Only children older than 16 years old. Dependent variable: Panel A: Years of completed schooling in formal
education only; Panel B : Years of completed schooling including the attendance of training courses. Controls
include: age, age squared, birth order dummies, a dummy for attendance, a dummy for the 1992 schooling reform.
At the bottom of Panel A and B, p-values associated to one-sided tests on the mother ’s coefficients being bigger
than the father’s coefficients at each stage are reported. Standard errors clustered at the family level are in
parentheses. Significance at the 10 % level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.6: The effect of parental migration on the index of schooling of the children left
behind
A. Dependent Variable: Index of Schooling computed on Formal Education Only
All children Females only Males only
(1) (2) (3)
Paternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0255 -0.0340 0.0285
(0.036) (0.069) (0.060)
Maternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.2491 0.2413 -0.1564
(0.212) (0.272) (0.536)
Paternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -0.0238 -0.0022 -0.0255
(0.048) (0.077) (0.080)
Maternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -0.3884 -0.3549 -0.5237
(0.241) (0.354) (0.539)
Paternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.0623 0.0906 -0.2873**
(0.070) (0.099) (0.120)
Maternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.0058 -0.2098 0.4572
(0.249) (0.611) (0.344)
Female -0.0069
(0.026)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 21,638 8,263 8,412
Number of amilies 6,804 3,254 3,334
R-squared 0.0800 0.0877 0.0741
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.851 0.837 0.366
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.0690 0.165 0.180
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.586 0.314 0.980
B. Dependent Variable: Index of Schooling including Training Courses
Paternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0225 -0.0587 0.0507
(0.038) (0.070) (0.062)
Maternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.1655 0.0933 -0.2961
(0.220) (0.310) (0.565)
Paternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -0.0224 -0.0289 -0.0103
(0.050) (0.080) (0.082)
Maternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -0.5236** -0.6863* -0.4966
(0.257) (0.409) (0.528)
Paternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.0764 0.0643 -0.2834**
(0.073) (0.107) (0.123)
Maternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.0625 -0.0644 0.4884
(0.274) (0.615) (0.340)
Female -0.0117
(0.027)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 21,638 8,263 8,412
Number of Families 6,804 3,254 3,334
R-squared 0.0825 0.0961 0.0770
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.739 0.684 0.271
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.0277 0.0572 0.181
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.519 0.418 0.984
Note. Only children aged 6 years and older. Dependent variable: Panel A: Index of schooling computed on
formal education; Panel B : Index of schooling computed on formal education including the attendance of training
courses. Controls include: age, age squared, birth order dummies, a dummy for attendance, a dummy for the
1992 schooling reform. At the bottom of Panel A and B, p-values associated to one-sided tests on the mother’s
coefficients being bigger than the father’s coefficients at each stage are reported. Standard errors clustered at the
family level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10 % level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at
the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.7: The effect of parental migration duration on the years of schooling of children
left behind
A. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling in Formal Education Only
All children Females only Males only
(1) (2) (3)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 6 years old -0.0198 0.0136 0.0269
(0.052) (0.101) (0.070)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 6 years old 0.1348 -0.3700 -0.7955**
(0.172) (0.789) (0.348)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 12 years old 0.0660 -0.0672 0.0936
(0.055) (0.076) (0.097)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 12 years old -0.4030 -0.3213* 0.2723
(0.366) (0.164) (0.554)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 15 -0.1156 -0.0571 -0.3553**
(0.090) (0.136) (0.152)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 15 years old -0.0545 -0.5108 0.2750**
(0.284) (0.598) (0.123)
Female 0.0648
(0.076)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 7,494 2,196 2,069
Number of family 3,683 938 889
R-squared 0.0527 0.0522 0.0669
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.805 0.315 0.0104
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.103 0.0809 0.624
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.581 0.229 0.999
B. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling including Training Courses
Duration of paternal absence before turning 6 -0.0113 -0.0180 0.0739
(0.056) (0.105) (0.070)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 6 0.0400 -1.0958 -1.2498*
(0.239) (1.171) (0.645)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 12 0.0780 -0.1388 0.1366
(0.061) (0.095) (0.094)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 12 -0.4895 -0.4894* 0.2661
(0.370) (0.278) (0.546)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 15 -0.1696* -0.1612 -0.3585**
(0.096) (0.158) (0.154)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 15 -0.2333 -0.6273 0.2756**
(0.347) (0.774) (0.122)
Female 0.2450***
(0.080)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 7,494 2,196 2,069
Number of Families 3,683 938 889
R-squared 0.0552 0.0577 0.0706
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.583 0.180 0.0208
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.0654 0.118 0.592
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.430 0.277 0.999
Note. Only children aged 16 years and older. Dependent variable: Panel A: Years of completed schooling
in formal education only; Panel B : Years of completed schooling including the attendance of training courses.
Controls include: age, age squared, birth order dummies, a dummy for attendance, a dummy for the 1992 schooling
reform. At the bottom of Panel A and B, p-values associated to one-sided tests on the mother’s coefficients being
bigger than the father’s coefficients at each stage are reported. Standard errors clustered at the family level are
in parentheses. Significance at the 10 % level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by
***.
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Table 1.8: The effect of parental migration duration on the index of schooling of children
left behind
A. Dependent Variable: Index of Schooling computed on Formal Education Only
All children Females only Males only
(1) (2) (3)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 6 years old 0.0071 0.0045 0.0144
(0.018) (0.033) (0.027)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 6 years old -0.0187 0.0404 -0.0826
(0.065) (0.152) (0.175)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 12 years old 0.0259 0.0037 0.0424
(0.018) (0.031) (0.029)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 12 years old -0.0755 -0.1626* 0.1812
(0.118) (0.087) (0.267)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 15 years old -0.0449 0.0413 -0.1719***
(0.038) (0.052) (0.065)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 15 years old -0.0570 -0.0953 -0.0218
(0.133) (0.227) (0.184)
female -0.0081
(0.026)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 21,638 8,263 8,412
Number of Families 6,804 3,254 3,334
R-squared 0.0798 0.0878 0.0742
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.350 0.592 0.292
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.198 0.0361 0.697
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.465 0.279 0.779
B. Dependent Variable: Index of Schooling including Training Courses
Duration of paternal absence before turning 6 years old 0.0107 -0.0064 0.0315
(0.019) (0.035) (0.029)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 6 years old -0.0387 -0.0145 -0.1332
(0.066) (0.144) (0.182)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 12 years old 0.0277 -0.0040 0.0452
(0.019) (0.034) (0.030)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 12 years old -0.1048 -0.1796** 0.1523
(0.118) (0.086) (0.273)
Duration of paternal absence before turning 15 years old -0.0482 0.0351 -0.1701**
(0.040) (0.058) (0.066)
Duration of maternal absence before turning 15 years old -0.0756 -0.0877 0.0040
(0.142) (0.272) (0.188)
female -0.0130
(0.027)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 21,638 8,263 8,412
Number of Families 6,804 3,254 3,334
R-squared 0.0823 0.0958 0.0773
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.235 0.478 0.186
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.134 0.0294 0.652
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.426 0.329 0.810
Note. Only children aged 6 years and older. Dependent variable: Panel A: Index of schooling computed on
formal education; Panel B : Index of schooling computed on formal education including the attendance of training
courses. Controls include: age, age squared, birth order dummies, a dummy for attendance, a dummy for the
1992 schooling reform. At the bottom of Panel A and B, p-values associated to one-sided tests on the mother’s
coefficients being bigger than the father’s coefficients at each stage are reported. Standard errors clustered at the
family level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10 % level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at
the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.9: The effect of parental migration on the schooling of children left behind -
Children aged 19 years or older
A. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling in Formal Education Only
All children Females only Males only
(1) (2) (3)
Paternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0625 0.5308 0.0381
(0.231) (0.407) (0.350)
Maternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0940 -1.0239 -2.2806
(0.738) (0.890) (1.800)
Paternal absence when child is 12-13 years old 0.0433 -0.4465 0.2594
(0.254) (0.354) (0.407)
Maternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -1.4120* -1.3814 -5.6969***
(0.832) (0.967) (1.795)
Paternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.1306 0.1483 -0.5112
(0.276) (0.376) (0.462)
Maternal absence when child is 15-16 years old 0.0488 -0.4104 -0.8297
(0.913) (1.653) (1.767)
Female -0.1246
(0.128)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 4,270 1,459 1,378
Number of Families 2,343 812 789
Average Schooling 8.607 8.624 8.567
Average Attendance Rate 0.137 0.129 0.134
R-squared 0.0601 0.0767 0.0803
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.516 0.0535 0.104
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.0472 0.180 0.000624
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.575 0.371 0.431
B. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling including Training Courses
Paternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0510 0.3282 0.0986
(0.237) (0.387) (0.341)
Maternal absence when child is 6-7 years old -0.2759 -0.9118 -2.0135
(0.630) (0.843) (1.643)
Paternal absence when child is 12-13 years old 0.0061 -0.8158** 0.4234
(0.274) (0.391) (0.401)
Maternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -2.0295*** -2.8820*** -4.8145***
(0.715) (1.077) (1.640)
Paternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.3397 -0.1551 -0.4627
(0.284) (0.435) (0.468)
Maternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.1511 -0.1232 -0.5773
(0.970) (1.658) (1.607)
Female 0.1315
(0.133)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √ √
Observations 4,270 1,459 1,378
Number of Families 2,343 812 789
R-squared 0.0570 0.0846 0.0731
Average Schooling 8.970 9.132 8.790
Average Attendance Rate 0.137 0.129 0.134
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.314 0.0873 0.106
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.00381 0.0351 0.000973
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.574 0.507 0.473
Note. Only children older than 19 years. Dependent variable: Panel A: Years of completed schooling in formal
education only; Panel B : Years of completed schooling including the attendance of training courses. Controls
include: age, age squared, birth order dummies, a dummy for attendance, a dummy for the 1992 schooling reform.
At the bottom of Panel A and B, p-values associated to one-sided tests on the mother’s coefficients being bigger
than the father’s coefficients at each stage are reported. Standard errors clustered at the family level are in
parentheses. Significance at the 10 % level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.10: The effect of parental migration on the schooling of children left behind -
Selected samples
A. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling in Formal Education Only
All children HH Less than 4 kids HH
(1) (2)
Paternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.1904 0.1834
(0.306) (0.332)
Maternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.7405 0.6784
(0.962) (0.697)
Paternal absence when child is 12-13 years old 0.0544 0.1564
(0.303) (0.332)
Maternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -1.6392** -2.3363***
(0.718) (0.850)
Paternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.7135*** -0.3243
(0.247) (0.258)
Maternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.5765 -0.1019
(0.761) (0.687)
Female -0.0169 0.0423
(0.140) (0.146)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √
Observations 2,653 2,993
Number of Families 1,210 1,636
R-squared 0.0756 0.0806
Average Schooling 9.506 9.474
Average Attendance Rate 0.277 0.296
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.708 0.739
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 0.0151 0.00319
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.568 0.619
B. Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling including Training Courses
Paternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.0302 0.0060
(0.310) (0.335)
Maternal absence when child is 6-7 years old 0.4566 0.4156
(0.827) (0.612)
Paternal absence when child is 12-13 years old 0.1463 0.1948
(0.318) (0.350)
Maternal absence when child is 12-13 years old -3.4825*** -3.0357***
(0.550) (0.689)
Paternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.8972*** -0.5456**
(0.258) (0.266)
Maternal absence when child is 15-16 years old -0.7878 -0.2605
(0.800) (0.736)
Female 0.2407* 0.2685*
(0.145) (0.152)
Family Fixed Effect
√ √
Birth Order Dummies
√ √
Observations 2,653 2,993
Number of Families 1,210 1,636
R-squared 0.0819 0.0897
Average Schooling 9.506 9.474
Average Attendance Rate 0.277 0.296
Mother > Father at 6-7 years old 0.686 0.721
Mother > Father at 12-13 years old 1.20e-08 1.51e-05
Mother > Father at 15-16 years old 0.552 0.642
Note. Column (1): the sample includes children all aged 16 years or older and whose siblings are all in the
household. Column (2): the sample includes all children aged 16 years or older whose family size if four or
less. Dependent variable: Panel A: Years of completed schooling in formal education only; Panel B : Years of
completed schooling including the attendance of training courses. Controls include: age, age squared, birth
order dummies, a dummy for attendance, a dummy for the 1992 schooling reform. At the bottom of Panel A and
B, p-values associated to one-sided tests on the mother’s coefficients being bigger than the father’s coefficients
at each stage are reported. Standard errors clustered at the family level are in parentheses. Significance at the
10 % level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
Chapter 2
Family Size, Sibling Rivalry and Migration:
Evidence from Mexico1
2.1 Introduction
Migration from poor to rich countries is one of the most important ways through which
workers can increase their income opportunities as well as their families’ welfare back
home (Chen et al., 2003b; Kennan and Walker, 2011b; Clemens, 2011). A key feature of
migration is that it mainly involves young adults who are more likely to have a positive
net expected return to migration due to their longer remaining life expectancy (Sjaastad,
1962). According to recent UN figures, international migrants aged 15 to 24 in the world
account for 12.5 per cent of total migrants worldwide, and when migrants between the ages
of 25 and 34 are added, young migrants represent over 30 per cent of the total (UNDESA,
2011). The proportion of youth migrants is much higher in developing countries than in
developed ones and it more than doubles if we consider internal migrants as well (UN,
2013).
Given the profitable nature of labor mobility, which involves both the (young) mi-
grant and her origin family, an extensive literature on the determinants of migration has
emphasized the important role of household (along with individual) factors in the migra-
tion decision (e.g. Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Stark, 1991). Indeed, in many developing
countries labor migration is a family strategy to diversify income sources, improve earn-
ing potentials and increase household security through remittances (e.g. Stark and Bloom,
1985; Yang, 2008; Antman, 2012a).
1This is a joint work with M. Bratti and M. Mendola
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As a result, family migration strategies in developing countries may involve the costly
parental decision to dispatch one of their children to work in a different city or abroad,
and to invest in a potentially remitting child (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Jensen and Miller,
2011). Yet, parents face a number of trade-offs when allocating resources across their
children, due to either limited household resources or (perceived) different returns to
the migration investment (e.g., pro-male bias).2 This may generate resource diluition
effects in large families or competition (rivalry) among siblings from the same household
(Garg and Morduch, 1998; Black et al., 2005). Although the determinants of migration
have already been studied extensively, far less is known about the role of the size and
the structure of the origin household – in particular the role of siblings – on migration
investment decisions. This is a surprising gap given the popular view that migrants come
from high-fertility countries and typically leave behind several household members who
oftentimes are siblings (Hatton and Williamson, 1998).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to assess the causal effect of
demographic characteristics of one’s childhood household, i.e. sibship size, birth order
and composition of siblings (by gender and age), on the likelihood to migrate abroad.3
We address this question in the context of the the Mexico-U.S. mass migration in the
1990s. Mexico is one of the largest migrant-sending and remittance-recipient countries
worldwide, with a migration wave that swelled in the 1970s and kept growing in the
1980s and 1990s, accounting from 5.2 percent of Mexico’s national population in 1990 to
a peak of 10.2 per cent in 2005 (Hanson and McIntosh, 2010). According to the Mex-
ico’s Population Census, during the 1990s alone, 9 percent of Mexicans 16 to 25 years
old (based on age in 1990) migrated to the United States. A distinguishing feature of
last century Mexico-U.S. migration is that most migrants have usually low levels of ed-
ucation and many of them have their first U.S. jobs in the seasonal agriculture (Martin,
1993).4 According to U.S. Census data, in 1990 70.4 percent of Mexican immigrant men
were high-school dropouts, against 12.9 percent of male native-born working population
and 21 percent of non-Mexican immigrant working men (Borjas and Katz, 2005). Yet,
2A well-established theoretical literature in economics rationalizes a causal link running from children’s
economic resources to their lifetime opportunities and their adult outcomes (Becker and Tomes, 1976;
Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990)
3Several studies document sibship size and birth order effects in outcomes as varied as schooling,
height, IQ (see Black et al., 2005; Angrist et al., 2010; Pande, 2003; Jayachandran and Pande, 2015,
among others).
4U.S. policy supported the recruitment of rural Mexicans under bilateral agreement between 1940s
and 1960s (e.g., the Bracero Program) but most of the 20th century Mexican migrants arrived and were
employed outside guestworker programs (Martin, 1993).
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the American Dream creates opportunities for upward mobility such that Mexican immi-
grants enjoy income gains with respect to their counterparts living in Mexico, and family
members at home share in these gains through remittances (Hanson, 2004; Ozden and
Schiff, 2006; Rosenzweig, 2007; Clemens et al., 2010). Importantly, emigration rates dif-
fer by age and gender. As reported by Hanson and McIntosh (2010) by using Mexico’s
population censuses, a significant fraction of males migrates by age 16 with emigration
increasing sharply until around age 30 and decreasing thereafter, presumably as a result
of return migration. For Mexican women instead, there is less emigration by age 16, with
subsequent rates being relatively stable over the course of their lives.5
Moreover, interestingly enough the 1990s wave of Mexican migration has been crossing
over a demographic boom that petered out years later. Mexico’s birth rate stood at
about seven children per mother in 1970. The gradual spread of family planning practices
contributed to impel the fertility transition in the country where, by 2005, the number
of children per woman declined to slightly more than two (Cabrera, 1994).6 Yet, despite
the abundant evidence on the potentially significant implications of high fertility rates for
child investments and economic outcomes, the existing literature provides scant rigourous
analysis of the link between family size7 and offspring’s international migration.
By using two waves of a large and nationally-representative demographic household
survey, we focus on the determinants of migration of Mexican adolescents and young
adults in the age range 15-25. Our large dataset allows us to overcome limitations of
small samples of children and includes detailed information on fertility histories, infant
and general mortality. Importantly, it allows us to address the potential endogeneity of
parental fertility choices which arises from the fact that families who choose to have more
children may also be those who value child out-migration more. This may be the case as, in
a context such as Mexico with weak institutions and imperfect credit or insurance markets,
children may be viewed as a way to acquire old-age security and support (Becker, 1960;
Cigno, 1993).8 Thus, the lure of international migration from Mexico to the U.S. may
5See Figure 2 reported in Hanson and McIntosh (2010).
6In 1974 a new population policy was designed in Mexico with the aim to reduce population growth
and to promote development. The new institutional structure set up to ensure the policy implementa-
tion (the National Population Council- CONAPO) has expandend geographically and socially over time
(Zuniga Herrera, 2008).
7We use ‘family size’ (i.e. the number of children) and ‘sibship size’ (i.e. the number of siblings) as
synonymous: the first takes the point of view of parents, the second the one of children.
8We use data on young adults in Mexico in the mid 1990’s whereby fertility decisions of their mothers
were taken across the ’70s and ’80s. At that time the country was classified as a developing poor economy
and the lack of markets or institutions were more likely to be mitigated by the family than it is the case
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increase the likelihood of upstream transfers from children to parents, and hence raise the
economic returns of high fertility for parents (Stark, 1981). We address this endogeneity
issue by exploiting exogenous variation in family size induced by either infertility shocks
or miscarriage at first pregnancy (Agu¨ero and Marks, 2008; Miller, 2011). We further
investigate birth order, sibling-sex and sibling-age composition effects on migration by
using family fixed effects, i.e. by exploiting between siblings variation only. This is
important in order to shed light on the intra-household selection process into migration,
which has important implications for child welfare, gender disparities and the ultimate
impact on origin families (Chen, 2006; Mourard, 2015).
We find no evidence that high fertility drives migration choices at the household level.
The positive correlation between fertility and migration disappears when the potential
endogeneity of sibship size is addressed. On the other hand, the chances to migrate are
not equally distributed across children within the same family. Older siblings, especially
firstborn males, are more likely to migrate, while having more sisters than brothers may
increase the chances of migration, especially among females. Results are robust to several
changes in both the estimation sample and the estimation strategy.
These findings have relevant implications. First, our analysis can contribute to explain-
ing the impact of fertility-reducing programs —such as investments in family planning,
sex and reproductive health— which have been endorsed in many developing countries
as a policy response to the apparent vicious circle of high-fertility, poverty and economic
stagnation (Miller and Babiarz, 2014; Schultz, 2008). Some of these programs have been
implemented in high fertility societies with significant out-migration rates, such as Mex-
ico, but little is known on the (intended and unintended) consequences of the former on
the latter. By observing a positive association between fertility and economic migration,
implications may be drawn that smaller families could lead to lower rates of mobility. Yet,
we provide little evidence that the causal relationship goes in this direction. Second, our
empirical findings hint to the fact that parental investment in offspring’s migration may
matter for dynamic fertility decisions in contexts of poor resources and high emigration
opportunities. The reason is that, in developing settings, offspring are the primary care-
takers of parents and they may do so by providing support to their origin family through
emigration and spatial diversification in residential location.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the link between household struc-
ture and migration as considered by the related literature on human capital investment.
in nowadays Mexico.
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Section 2.3 presents the data and sample selection. The methodology and empirical strat-
egy is described in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents our main results on birth order and
sibship size estimates, plus robustness checks. Section 2.6 reports results on the siblings’
compostion effect. Finally, Section 2.7 summarizes our main findings and concludes.
2.2 Related literature
Standard economic theory conceives labor migration as an investment in human capital
whereby relocation requires up-front resources followed by a positive payout in the future
(Sjaastad, 1962; Schultz, 1972; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011). Positive returns on migration,
which are higher for young people, are conceived in terms of both migrants’ earnings and
remittances sent back home (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Yang, 2008; Amuedo-Dorantes and
Pozo, 2011). Indee, people decide to migrate because they expect their own or their
family’s payoff to be higher in terms of a different and higher profile of earnings, quality
of life, health or security or because migration mitigates risks and household portfolios at
origin (Chen et al., 2003b; Kennan and Walker, 2011b; Clemens, 2011). Recent evidence
shows that – after controlling for self-selection– workers moving from a poor to a rich
country can experience immediate, lasting, and very likely increases in earnings, even for
exactly the same tasks (Gibson and McKenzie, 2012; Ashenfelter, 2012).9 Beyond income
gains for migrants, cross-border migration typically brings additional liquidity to family
members left behind through remittances, which significantly support consumption and
investment decisions, as well as the management of risk and credit constraints in the
household of origin.
Given the key economic role of migrants’ remittances, especially in developing con-
texts, several contributions in the migration literature point at the household as the main
unit for migration choices (Rosenzweig, 1988; Stark, 1991; Ghatak and Price, 1996). The
core feature of this collective decision-making framework is that the family aims at max-
imizing household income and therefore can take the costly decision to dispatch one (or
9By combining household data in Mexico with U.S. and Mexico population censuses, and controlling
for self-selection on observables and unobservables in migration, recent works estimate that yearly income
gains to Mexico-U.S. migration are around 6,700 to 8,000 U.S. dollars (Hanson, 2004; Clemens et al.,
2010). Moreover, according to the 2009 poll by the Pew Research Center, a third of all Mexicans would
move to the U.S. if they could, and half of these potential Mexican migrants report to be prepared to
move illegally to the U.S. According to more than 55 percent of those polled in Mexico, Mexicans who
move to the U.S. have a better life despite well-known hardships, while less than 15 percent report life is
worse in the U.S.
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more) young member to work in foreign labor markets in order to receive remittances
(Stark and Bloom, 1985). In the absence of well-functioning credit or insurance markets
then, migration can be a household investment strategy whereby one or more members
are assigned to work in the local economy while others are sent abroad to act as a source of
insurance or financial enhancement. Empirical evidence on the implications of migration
as a family security strategy in developing countries is abundant (see Ratha et al., 2011,
for a review). Rapoport and Docquier (2006), for instance, survey the different motives
for remittances sent by migrants, which are found to be used also as a form of support to
the elderly (see also Clemens et al., 2014). By using data from Mexico, Antman (2012a)
shows that children migrated to the U.S. (strategically) provide financial contributions
to health cares for their parents (see also Sto¨hr, 2015). At the same time though, little
evidence exists on the degree to which family environment — in particular family size
and composition — affects children’s out-migration decisions.
The link between the household structure and parents’ investments on the human
capital of their children has received substantive attention in the Household Economics
literature. Theoretical models of fertility choices have been widely influenced by the ar-
gument of the ‘quantity-quality (Q-Q) trade-off’. The Q-Q model treats the quantity
and quality of children in a similar fashion as other consumption goods in the household
so that, in the absence of parental discrimination between children, there is a trade-off
between child ‘quality’ or outcomes, and the number of children within a family (Becker,
1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1976). However, in many of today’s
developing countries (as well as in rich countries around the time of their industrial revo-
lution) parents have often used their children as a substitute for missing institutions and
markets, notably social security in old age (e.g. Nugent, 1985; Cigno, 1993; Ray, 1998).10
According to this framework — known as the ‘old-age security hypothesis’ — on top of the
consumption-good aspect of children, fertility choices are influenced by the child role of
investment-good or household asset. Children embody income-earning possibilities both
for themselves and for their parents, and this may be the reason why in poor contexts
(i.e. with weak formal markets and social safety-nets) people generally choose to invest in
their future in the form of children (Duflo and Banerjee, 2011). The traditional system of
family arrangement, though, may have important consequences on economic choices and
10Recent contributions on contemporary developed societies show that when pensions and income from
retirement decrease, the old-age security motive matters for fertility decisions even in these settings (see
Ga´bos et al., 2009; Billari and Galasso, 2014).
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offspring’s outcomes (Platteau, 1991).
While an extensive empirical literature provides evidence on the role of household
size and composition on parental investments in other forms of children’s human capital,
such as education or health, (Garg and Morduch, 1998; Black et al., 2005), within-family
considerations have been less analyzed in the context of migration decisions.11 Yet, if
migration is costly and migrants move at a relatively young age, it is plausible that
migration is the result of family decision-making in which parents decide on their children’s
relocation (potentially retaining some control over their children’s earnings as well), or
children are influenced by their family background (e.g., household characteristics, number
of siblings) while deciding to move. Thus, in families with limited resources and more than
one child to raise, greater sibship size may negatively affect child out-migration through a
resource dilution effect (i.e. a smaller share of resources per child) or because more family-
work is needed at home, e.g., care for younger children (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Giles
and Mu, 2007). On the other hand, larger families may increase the pressure of the family
hierarchy, higher dependency ratio and the amount of disposable resources, to support
the family members. Hence, a reallocation of resources from children to parents may
become necessary so that young household members are dispatched abroad in order to
send remittances or offer potential support back home. In particular, if children contribute
to family income either through child-labor, economic diversification or parental-care, a
larger number of siblings may have a positive effect on the out-migration of one (or more)
of them (Brezis and Ferreira, 2014; Sto¨hr, 2015). The relative strength of these competing
forces is ultimately an empirical question. This is what we turn to in the following sections.
2.3 Data and sample selection
This study uses data from the 1992 and 1997 waves of the Encuesta Nacional de la
Dina´mica Demogra´fica (ENADID), conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and
Geography (INEGI) in Mexico. Each ENADID’s wave surveys more than 50,000 house-
holds from all over the country and is representative of the Mexican population. The
dataset is very reach and unique in collecting comprehensive information on women’s
11Findings on the impact of family size on child outcomes are mixed. Early results tended to predomi-
nantly show that children from larger families have worse outcomes, especially in terms of human capital
investment and earnings (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Hanushek, 1992; Parish and Willis, 1993). Yet,
after controlling for the endogeneity of fertility, in more recent papers family size turns out not to ad-
versely affect child outcomes (see Black et al., 2005; Angrist et al., 2010; Fitzsimons and Malde, 2014,
among others).
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fertility as well as migration history of all household members, along with standard socio-
economic characteristics. Importantly, by using detailed demographic information on age
(month and year of birth) and gender of individuals in the same household with the same
mother, we are able to identify all biological families in the sample and recover complete
information on the number and gender of all siblings (also those not currently living in
the household of origin).
The ENADID allows us to define household members’ international migration experi-
ence from three separate questions, i.e. (i) whether there is any household member (even
temporarily absent) migrated abroad during the five years prior to the survey; (ii) whether
any household member has ever worked in or looked for work in the United States (and
the year in which this occurred); (iii) whether the respondent reports a period of residence
abroad at any point in time prior to the survey. The use of these three different sources
of information for migration episodes ensures that we are able to capture a relevant part
of the phenomenon.12 Overall, almost 18 percent of households in Mexico reports having
a member migrated abroad in 1997, and up from 15 percent in 1992.
Since we are interested in the effect of family size on parental investment in offspring’s
migration, we define individual migration episodes as non-tied migration, i.e. we exclude
from the sample children who experienced episodes of migration joint with their parents
and those whose parents have an international migration experience.13 Figure 2.1 reports
the incidence of non-tied migration by age and gender in Mexico and shows that, overall,
migrants are massively concentrated (more that 70%) in the age range 15-25. Hence,
throughout our analysis we restrict the sample to individuals aged 15 to 25. This is also
consistent with the argument that Mexican youngsters finish compulsory schooling and
potentially enter the labor market at the age of 15, whereas beyond the age of 25 they
are more likely to make their own life out of the origin family.14
12By containing information on migrants who have either returned to Mexico, or who have at least
one household member remaining in Mexico, excluding households which have migrated abroad in their
entirety, the ENADID tends to under represent permanent tied migrants (see also Hanson, 2004; Mckenzie
and Rapoport, 2007). Yet, the latter form of potential selection is of little concern to us since our main
outcome of interest is the effect of family size on parental investment in children’s migration, so that
we do need to exclude ‘family migration’ and focus on households left behind by one or more migrant
member.
13Yet, we investigated the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of tied-migrants as well (9 percent
of the sample), including parents’ migration status among the controls (results available upon request).
In their study of Mexican migration to the U.S., Cerrutti and Massey (2001a) report that nearly half of
all male migrants leave to the U.S. before or without a wife or a parent.
14Yet, our findings are also robust to the sample cut on individuals aged 15 to 35. Results are available
upon request.
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The ENADID further collects detailed information on fertility for all women aged
15 to 54 at the time of the survey. Women answered specific questions on the number
of the children ever born, their gender and birth order, current and past contraceptive
use, fertility preferences, and their socioeconomic and marital status. Such information
allow us to construct our key explanatory variable, that is the total number of biological
siblings of each individual in the sample. Moreover, it enables us to identify parental
exogenous shocks to fertility induced by self-reported infertility episodes and miscarriage
at first pregnancy (see Section 2.4.2 for more details). In line with the medical definition
of infertility 15 and with the literature (e.g., Agu¨ero and Marks, 2011), we restrict our
sample to children of non-sterilized women who are not currently using contraceptives or
who never did (about 80 per cent of the original sample).
Our final estimation sample is made of 26,743 children in the age range 15-25, whose
mother’s fertility history is likely to be completed such that full siblings’ information
is observed.16 In our sample of individuals, 5.2 percent are migrants with male and
female migration rates equal to 7.07 and 2.92 percent, respectively. In Figure 2.2 we
plot the average migration rate of boys and girls in our sample by sibship size. A positive
association between sibship size and migration for sons clearly emerges. Individual sample
characteristics are reported in Table 2.1 according to the migration status. Migrants are
mostly males (75 percent) and they report significantly more brothers and sisters than
non-migrants. Moreover, migrant children appear to be slightly older and to live in
less educated but richer (in terms of income) households with respect to non-migrant
youngsters.
In Figure 2.3 we plot the ratio of migrant children in the household by family size,
in the sample of households with at least one migrant child (against the distribution of
migrant households in the population. The plot shows a negative association between
the child migrant ratio and sibship size, which means that all households, of any size,
hardly have more than one young member migrated abroad (the average number of young
migrant members per household is 1.14 in the sample of households with migrants). This
is suggestive of an intra-household selection process into offspring’s migration which we
15The medical literature defines infertility as the failure to conceive after a year of regular intercourse
without contraception.
16Mothers of individuals in our estimation sample are on average 45 years old. The average birth spacing
between the first and the last child in our estimation sample is 13 years, that is below the minimum age
of individuals we consider (15). Our sample of children does not include those with mothers older than
54 years of age (9 percent of the total population aged 15-25) since fertility information was not collected
from them.
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explore further through inferential analysis in the following sections.
2.4 Empirical strategy and identification
2.4.1 Sibship size and birth order effects
In our analysis we are interested in the effects of sibship size and composition on an
individual’s likelihood to migrate. In order to estimate the effect of sibship size, though,
we need to control for children’s birth order (see, for instance Black et al., 2005). Indeed,
if parents have a preference for the first children they have, and invest comparatively
more resources in them, a spurious negative correlation between sibship size and human
capital investments may emerge just because in larger families we also find children with
higher birth orders. In other words, the two variables birth order and sibship size are
highly correlated. In particular, while one can assess the effect of family size on firstborns
by looking at firstborns’ outcomes in families of different size, it is not possible to look,
for instance, at the outcome of a fourth-born child when sibship size changes from two to
three, as fourth born children are only found in larger families.
Recently, Bagger et al. (2013) have proposed a theoretically-grounded methodology
to disentangle the two effects. We draw on their study to employ a two-step estimation
strategy. In a first step we estimate the following regression using OLS:
Mij = α0 +
K∑
k=1
α1kboijk +α2Xij + uj + ij (2.1)
where the outcome variable Mij pertains to the migration status of child i in household
j and is a dichotomous indicator for either current or past migration experiences abroad.
boijk is a dichotomous indicator for the child being of birth order k = 1, ..K where K is
the maximum number of children (i.e. family size) in the families in our sample (so as
the maximum sibship size is K − 1); Xij is a vector of individual covariates including
child gender, age, age squared and cohort indicators (one for each year of birth).17 uj is
a family fixed effect,18 and ij an idiosyncratic error.
The effect of sibship size is captured in equation (2.1) by the family fixed effects, which
17We can include both a control for age and birth cohort indicators since we are using two cross-section
surveys.
18Since our sample includes siblings born from the same mother, we are de facto controlling for mother
fixed effects.
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control for any (observed and unobserved) difference between families. The inclusion of
family fixed effects also helps address the birth order endogeneity due, for example, to
birth-order selective child fostering (cf. Bagger et al., 2013). The birth order fixed effects
capture the differences in the probability of migration between children of different order
within the same family. Only within-family variation is exploited in these estimates, and
birth order effects are not contaminated by between-family variation in family sizes, i.e.
the fact that children in larger families also have higher average birth orders.
In a second step, we subtract the birth order effects from the dependent variable, i.e.
we compute the difference ˆNM ij = Mij −
∑K
k=1 αˆ1kboijk where NM stands for ‘netted
migration’, and use it as the dependent variable in a second step.19 Hence, the following
equation is estimated:
ˆNM ij = β0 + β1Sij + β2Xij + β3Wj + vij (2.2)
where Sij is sibship size. The coefficient β1 captures the effect on migration of being grown
in a family with sibship size Sij for the ‘average child’ in that family, i.e. irrespective of
his/her birth order. Xij is a vector of individual covariates defined as above and Wj
includes family background characteristics such as mother’s and father’s age and age
squared, and mother’s and father’s years of completed education. In some specifications,
we also control for maternal health, the father not being in the household (i.e. widowed
and divorced single-mother families) and municipality fixed effects (which also capture
the rural vs. urban residence along many other factors related to different local cultural
or economic conditions, access to contraception, etc.). Since the dependent variable has
been generated by a regression, standard errors are corrected by weighting the estimation
with the inverse of the standard error of ˆNM ij.
20 We estimate equation (2.2) by using
either WLS or 2SLS (see the next Section). Throughout, standard errors are clustered at
the household level to account for potential error correlation across siblings.
2.4.2 The sibship size effect: Identification strategy
If the number of children and investment in child out-migration are both outcomes over
which parents exercise some choice, the sibship size’s effect estimate in equation (2.2)
will provide spurious evidence. In other words, parental fertility may be endogenous
19Coefficients of all birth order indicators are recovered using the method described in Suits (1984).
20See, for instance Lewis and Linzer (2005). We also run estimates using OLS and White robust
standard errors, and the results on the effect of sibship size did not change.
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with respect to children’s migration. It is plausible, for instance, that the opportunity
to send some children abroad modifies parents’ fertility choices. In developing countries,
children are a valuable asset for parents and a source of old-age support. If offspring’s
migration opportunities are not equally distributed across families, it may happen that
households with lower migration costs or higher benefits for their members will also decide
to have more children. Alternatively, unobservable parental preferences for children and
old-age support through migration may co-vary positively. Stark (1981) and Williamson
(1990), for instance, postulate that heterogeneity in parents’ preferences for childbearing
and for migration are systematically related, and in a context such as Mexico where
migration cum remittances is an essential lifeline to households of origin, they are generally
positively related. In both these cases the positive association observed between fertility
and child out-migration is likely to overstate the true causal relationship. This pattern of
preferences’ or migration costs’ heterogeneity would lead to a larger positive association
between fertility and child out-migration than it would be observed if fertility changes
due to exogenous shocks.
Hence, to clearly identify the relationship between sibship size and migration, a pre-
sumably exogenous source of variation in family size is needed. ENADID allows us to
identify self-reported infertility from specific questions asked to non-sterilized women who
never used contraceptive methods or who are not currently using them. More specifically,
we construct an indicator variable for infertility shocks taking value one if a woman de-
clares she never used contraception or she has stopped using the previous method because
of infertility (‘infertility shock’) and zero otherwise (Agu¨ero and Marks, 2008).21 ENA-
DID also enables us to build a second indicator variable which equals one if a woman
experienced a miscarriage at first pregnancy (‘fertility shock’) and zero otherwise. In
order for our identification strategy to be valid, the two instruments must satisfy three
conditions — i.e. exogeneity, relevance and the exclusion restriction assumption — which
we discuss below.
Infertility or subfertility conditions have been already used in the economic literature
to estimate the effect of the number of children and fertility timing on mothers’ labor
market outcomes (see, for instance, Agu¨ero and Marks, 2008, 2011; Schultz, 2008). There
is evidence that infertility is virtually random, i.e. it is independent of the background
21Such shocks may only be temporary, and have emerged relatively recently. This means that even
subfertile women may have large families. Unfortunately, we do not have any information about the age
when these problems first showed up.
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characteristics of infertile women. For example, variables such as father’s social class and
parity have been shown to be unrelated to observed heterogeneity in fertility (Joffe and
Barnes, 2000). In an article summarizing the epidemiological literature regarding the role
of lifestyle factors (cigarette smoking, alcohol and caffeine consumption, exercise, BMI,
and drug use) on female infertility, Buck et al. (1997) conclude that few risk factors have
been assessed or identified for secondary infertility. Also, education, occupation, and
race have been shown to be unrelated with impaired fecundity using U.S. data (Wilcox
and Mosher, 1993). By using data on a large set of developing countries, Agu¨ero and
Marks (2011) present evidence that infertility is generally uncorrelated with background
characteristics of women, with a few exceptions such as women’s education and rural
residence (which will be controlled for in our models).
Also miscarriages and stillbirths have been used to identify fertility tempo and quantum
effects on women’s labor market outcomes, mainly in advanced countries (Hotz et al.,
2005; Miller, 2011; Bratti and Cavalli, 2014). Their exogeneity is generally supported
by the medical literature. A few papers using administrative data in which rich labor
market and health data are merged show, for example, that miscarrying is not generally
significantly associated with worse labor market outcomes (e.g., work absences) before
miscarriage (Karimi, 2014; Markussen and Strøm, 2015). Miscarriage or spontaneous
abortion usually refers to any pregnancy loss that takes place before the 20th week of
pregnancy. For their nature, miscarriages should have a negative effect on total fertility,
and in our context on sibship size.22 Only two etiological factors for miscarriage are
recognized by different authors in the obstetric literature, i.e. uterine malformations and
the presence of balanced chromosomal rearrangements in parents (Plouffe et al., 1992).
The latter though, are unlikely to be correlated with women’s attitudes towards offspring’s
migration. The number of miscarriages and stillbirths will generally increase with the
number of pregnancies, which depend in turn on desired fertility, and this could potentially
generate a spurious positive correlation between the number of miscarriages and observed
fertility. For this reason, we only consider miscarriages occurred at the first pregnancy
(Miller, 2011). There is a potential issue of measurement error with this instrument, since
women may be unaware of miscarriages or, especially older women, may fail to recall them.
Misreporting would generally affect the power of the instrument, but we do not expect
22According to Bongaarts and Potter (1983) overall spontaneous loss rates are about 20 percent of
recognized pregnancies (i.e. one out of five). Casterline (1989) stresses how in most societies pregnancies
losses produce a reduction of fertility of 5-10% from levels expected in the absence of miscarriages and
stillbirths.
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any specific pattern of correlation between it and parents’ attitudes towards child out-
migration conditional on the observables (including a quadratic in mother’s age). Finally,
the question, as it was formulated in ENADID, does not distinguish between voluntary
and involuntary abortions. Thus, it may be the case that some of the reported abortions
were actually voluntary, even though induced abortion was illegal and Mexico had the
stricter anti-abortion legislation in Latin America during the period under consideration.23
For our instruments to be valid, in addition to exogeneity, they have to satisfy the
exclusion restriction assumption, i.e. fertility and infertility shocks must have an impact
on children’s migration only through sibship size. For this reason, in the child migration
equation we control for many variables that may act as a confounding factor and those
which may be affected by the shocks while having a direct effect on children’s migra-
tion. Among these variables, we include mother’s age, age at first pregnancy, education,
chronic illness/disability, marital status and husband’s characteristics (age, education and
absence).
24
In Figures 2.4 and 2.5 we report a preliminary visual representation of the relevance of
our instruments (more compelling evidence is given by the first-stage of the IVs reported
in Section 2.5). In particular, we use ENADID data to plot the life-cycle profile of the
total number of live births by women’s age and infertility shock and miscarriage status.
Figure 2.4 shows that women who ever experienced an infertility condition generally have
a lower number of children, and that differences in fertility tend to become evident after
23 For women who voluntary abort, the instrument would be endogenous. However, there is no evident
sign in our data that a relevant share of the recorded abortions could be voluntary. For instance, Catholic
women in our sample do not tend to abort significantly less than other women (this check can be done only
for the 1997 wave, which includes information on religion): for the first group the incidence of abortion is
4.6 percent and for the second group is 4.8 percent. In case the instrument is substantially contaminated
by voluntary abortions, we would expect IV estimates to be biased in the same direction as OLS. Indeed,
omitting subscripts and in the models without controls, if we define as M = β0 + β1S + v the migration
equation, where M and S are child migration status and sibship size, respectively, and S = γ0+γ1Z+u the
sibship size equation (the first stage) and Z the instrument (abortion), β1,OLS = β1 +Cov(S, v)/V ar(S)
while β1,IV = β1 +Cov(Z, v)/Cov(Z, S), where Cov(Z, S) < 0 and sign(Cov(S, v)) = −sign(Cov(Z, v)).
In case, for instance, unobserved mother’s total desired fertility is positively correlated with children’s
migration and a substantial share of abortions are voluntary, both OLS and IV will be similarly upward
biased.
24In Table A1 in Appendix we report women’s characteristics by fertility and infertility status. De-
scriptive statistics suggest that women who experienced infertility differ from those who did not in some
aspects, such as age, schooling, single-status and husband’s welfare (Panel A). A similar ‘positive’ selec-
tion is found for women who had an abortion at their first pregnancy (Panel B). Hence, we do include
these characteristics as controls in our regression models (with the exception of husband’s income that is
only available for the 1997 wave).
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the age of 30. Similarly, Figure 2.5 displays a negative association between miscarriage at
first birth and the total number of live births. Both figures suggest that our instruments
are relevant. They also suggest that, even though the shocks we consider have a negative
impact on family size, overall Mexican women were able to achieve a generally high fertility
rate by the end of their fecund life span. This is due to the fact that exogenous infertility
shocks, as defined in this and related papers, clearly affect the number of children a woman
can have but they may also be temporary (i.e. secondary infertility) or treatable so that
fertility may eventually be restored.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Birth order effects
We start by estimating the impact of birth order on individual migration, as specified in
equation (2.1), controlling for family fixed effects. The within-family estimator sweeps
out all parental- and family-level heterogeneity, including completed family size. More-
over, family fixed effects account for potential endogeneity of birth order effects due, for
example, to parental preferences for specific birth orders of children or for other omitted
family-specific unobservable factors. The first column of Table 2.2 reports estimates with
a linear specification of birth order on the full sample, while in column (2) we allow for a
more flexible specification by adding birth-order-specific dichotomous indicators. Regres-
sions control for individual age and gender plus child cohort dummies (one for each year
of birth).25 Indeed, child age is correlated with birth order and it is also likely to have a
(non-linear) relationship with migration (this is why we include the age quadratic term).
First, in column (1) we observe that, after controlling for family fixed effects, birth
order and individual characteristics, females are significantly less likely to migrate than
males by 3.6 percentage points (p.p. hereafter). Moreover, the birth order point estimate
is negative and statistically significant. The effect starts to be economically significant
from children of birth order 3, which are about 2.1 p.p. less likely to migrate than
firstborns (column 2). Although this appears to be a small effect in absolute value, it
roughly represents a 40 percent decrease in migration at the sample average (5.2 percent
migration rate). The coefficients for the following birth orders are larger in absolute value
25By including child age and cohort dummies, with household fixed effects, we are also de facto con-
trolling for birth spacing between siblings.
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and peak for birth orders 9 and 10 or more (-16.6 and -20 p.p. respectively).
In columns (3) and (4) we estimate the same regressions as above by adding interaction
effects between birth order and gender to the models.26 We observe a negative birth
order gradient for boys (the coefficients on third and higher parities are negative and
significant), consistently with average results above. The interactions of being female
with birth order dummies are not statistically significant, suggesting that the birth-order
gradient in child migration is not statistically different between boys and girls. Yet,
the latter holds for all parities but for firstborns: in column (4) the female main effect
shows that female firstborns are significantly less likely to migrate than male firstborns.
Overall, these estimates suggest that the chances of migration are not equally distributed
across children within the same family. Low-parity children are in general more likely to
migrate and this may be explained by the fact that, if migration is also a household-level
investment strategy, the family will have more time to reap the benefits of migration. Yet,
from our fidings a firstborn daughter is significantly less likely to migrate than a firstborn
son by 3 p.p., which means a reduction in the probability of migration of roughly 60
percent at the sample average migration rate. We further explore these gendered effects
in light of potential parental preferences later on in Section 2.6.
2.5.2 Sibship size effect: OLS and 2SLS results at the individual-
level
In this Section, we turn to the estimation of the sibship size effects. By applying the
two-step procedure described above, we start by reporting OLS estimates as a benchmark
model, where the dependent variable is ‘netted migration’ (see Section 2.4.1). The number
of siblings is tallied as the number of currently living biological brothers and sisters of
each child.27 The first column of Table 2.3 reports OLS results for a linear specification
including sibship size. The highly significant coefficient implies that, on average and
26As our two-step procedure relies on family fixed effects, when estimating separate regressions by
gender only families with at least two sons and at least two daughters can be included in the estimates
for males and females, respectively. In order to avoid such a sample selection, we rather adopt a pooled
estimation including interaction effects with gender.
27We drop from our definition of siblings those currently deceased. This is so because of two reasons:
(i) 70 per cent of deceased children in our sample died before the first year of life, 90 per cent of them
before the second one; (ii) the focus of our analysis is not on young children so that we need to take into
account siblings who actually ‘had enough time’ to both receive and compete over household resources,
so that can exclude infant deaths. In Appendix, we report robustness checks related to concerns about
the endogeneity of our definition of sibship size and birth order based on ever-born children, i.e. currently
alive or deceased.
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after controlling for birth order effects, adding one sibling is associated with a 1.1 p.p.
higher likelihood to migrate of young adults (+17 percent at the sample mean). The
same effect holds once we include individual level controls, namely child gender, age, age
squared and years of birth indicators (column 2). When we allow for differential effects
by child gender (column 3), the significant negative coefficient for the interaction term
indicates that the female likelihood to migrate increases less due to sibship size than
for males. Specifically, one extra sibling raises the migration probability more for sons
than for daughters by 0.8 p.p. In columns (4) to (7), we run the same regressions above
while adding further parental, household and aggregate-level controls in order to account
for potential confounding factors of the relationship between family size and offspring’s
migration. Specifically, in column (3) and (4) we include parental covariates, which may
predict completed fertility and affect child migration, namely mother’s years of birth
indicators, age at first pregnancy, chronic illness, single status (i.e. widow, divorced,
single de facto), father’s decade of birth indicators, mothers’ and father’s (quadratic)
age and years of schooling.28 In column (5) and (6) we further add municipality fixed
effects that, conditional on family size, control for rural vs. urban residence along with
many other local factors related to different cultural or economic conditions, which may
have an effect on fertility and migration (e.g. employment rates, migration intensity,
access to contraception, social services etc). All in all, the sibiship size effect is essentially
unchanged when we control for all of the aformentioned factors, and the same holds for
the differential effect by gender.
Yet, as mentioned in the methodological section, the coefficients on sibship size re-
ported in Table 2.3 are still likely to be biased, even when including a rich set of demo-
graphic and economic controls. This is so as fertility may be endogenous with respect to
child out-migration. Thus we employ an IV approach and exploit the arguably exogenous
fertility variation generated by episodes of infertility and miscarriage. Since these events
can vary the actual family size from the desired one, we use infertility shocks and mis-
carriage at first pregnancy to identify the effect of sibship size on child out-migration. In
Table 2.4 we present two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates using a linear version of our
‘saturated’ specification (with controls) and the two-step methodology, as outlined above,
to estimate equation (2.2). In column (1) we instrument sibship size with an indicator
variable for infertility shocks taking value one if the woman declares she never used or
28We are de facto also controlling for mother’s age at birth, which is a linear combination of child’s age
and mother’s age.
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she stopped using contraception because of infertility. In column (2), instead, we report
results using a woman’s experience of miscarriage on her first pregnancy as an instrument.
Eventually, in column (3) we present results using both instruments in an over-identified
equation model. Throughout all models, the first stage results point to a strong and
highly significant relationship between infertility /fertility shocks and completed fertil-
ity. In particular, women who experienced an infertility shock have a reduction in their
number of children of nearly 0.5 (t = −5.2) with an F−statistic of 26.9 (column 1). The
negative impact of miscarriage on completed fertility is similar in magnitude (−0.437)
with an F−statistic of 19.13 (column 2). Also the F−statistic of the joint significance
of the instruments in the over-identified model is as high as 23.37 (column 3). The sib-
ship size effects estimated using 2SLS are always small and statistically insignificant at
standard confidence levels. The Anderson-Rubin F−statistic cannot reject in none of the
models that the coefficient of the instrument is zero in the reduce form, and the Hansen
J−statistics confirms the validity of the instruments in the overidentified model. Interest-
ingly enough, the point estimate of the effect of sibship size on child migration obtained
with the abortion instrument (which might include voluntary abortions) is lower than that
obtained with the infertility instrument, which we consider much less (or not) affected
by endogeneity issues, and much lower than the OLS estimate, a fact that is inconsistent
with induced abortions being a substantial share of total abortions (cf. footnote 23).
In Table 2.5 we report results of the same 2SLS regressions as above while testing the
sibship size differential effect by gender in the pooled sample with interaction terms.29
Results do not point to any significant difference in the impact of sibiship size bewteen
boys and girls, as it turns out to be insignificant for both (columns 1-3). When using mis-
carriage as an instrument, though, we cannot draw strong conclusions as the F−statistic
for the interacted endogenous variable is rather low (4.27, column 2). However, even in
this case the Anderson-Rubin F−statistic confirms that we cannot reject the hypothesis
of sibship size not affecting child migration.
Overall, findings in this section point to the little role of family size on children’s
migration outcomes. This evidence is not in line with the popular view that high-fertility
in developing countries is a major cause of international emigration: according to our
estimates this correlation is driven by unobservable variables which make some families
more prone to both have more children and send some of them abroad.
29The interaction effect sibship size*female is instrumented using the interaction instrument*female,
where the instrument is infertility or miscarriage depending on the specification.
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2.5.3 Robustness checks: Household-level estimates
In this section, we estimate the migration equation while using the household instead of
the individual as the unit of analysis.30 In so doing we are able to check the robustness of
our baseline family size effect to changing the estimation sample and strategy. Indeed, the
two-step procedure reported above is based on household fixed effects and therefore can
only be applied to households with more than one child in the full sample. By contrast,
while focusing on the total number of migrants in the household as a function of total
fertility, we do not need to control for birth order effects and we can use a standard IV
procedure. As a consequence, household-level regressions allow us to include also one-child
households in the sample.31 Thus, we estimate a specification as follows:
mj = γ0 + γ1nj + γ2Wj + vj (2.3)
where the dependent variable is the number of migrants in household j and the inde-
pendent variable of interest is nj, i.e. the total number of children in household j. The
coefficient γ1 captures the increase in the number of migrants associated with a unitary
increase in the number of children. Like in the child-level estimates, Wj includes family
background characteristics such as the mother’s and the father’s age, age squared, and
years of completed education, mother’s age at first pregnancy, an indicator for the father
not being in the household and municipality fixed effects; vj is an household-level error
term. This specification is estimated both with OLS and with IVs (namely two-stage
least squares).
Results are reported in Table 2.6. Column (1) shows that a unit increase in the
number of children is associated with an average increase in the number of migrants in
the household of 0.012 (t = 10.6). Computed at the average number of child migrants per
household in the sample (0.077), this corresponds to a 16 percent increase. Column (2)
reports the IV estimate using the infertility instrument. The first stage shows a reduction
of -0.64 (t = −10.2) in the total number of children per woman who experienced an
infertiliy shock, with an F−statistic of 104. The first-stage coefficient is a bit higher in
magnitude than that obtained in the child-level estimates (-0.5). In spite of the strength
of the instrument, the second stage does not show any evidence of a positive effect of
fertility on migration: the coefficient on the number of children turns out to be negative
30More precisely, our unit of analysis is the biological family.
31Thus, in these estimates we also exploit individuals who do not have siblings, and look at whether
they are more (less) likely to migrate than individuals with siblings.
56 Chapter 2. Family Size, Sibling Rivalry and Migration: Evidence from Mexico
and statistically insignificant. Column (3) reports the IV results using the variation in the
number of children generated by miscarriage. Also in this case the first-stage coefficient is
highly statistically significant and negative, with an F−statistic of about 40. The negative
impact of miscarriage on total fertility is smaller than the one exerted by infertility, yet
it is quite large and precisely estimated, i.e. -0.44 (t = −6.3). Like for the previous
instrument, also in this case no significant effect is detected in the second stage. The
same happens in the overidentified model in column (4).
The household-level estimates in this section confirm the results of Section 2.5.2 of a
positive correlation between family size and migration, but of no causal effect of the former
on the latter. Also in this case, as with individual-level estimates, the larger magnitude
of OLS estimates relative to the IV ones points to an upward biased estimation because
of endogeneity, i.e. families more likely to send young migrants abroad tend to have more
children.
2.6 Sibling gender composition
Our estimates so far show that gender is a robust predictor of migration and, ceteris
paribus, boys – especially firstborns – are systematically more likely to migrate to the U.S.
than girls in Mexican families. This points to a migration male-dominated phenomenon
(e.g., Cerrutti and Massey, 2001a) that may be explained by (perceived) higher migration
returns for boys (due to either higher expected wages abroad than at home or by lower
moving costs for males with respect to females) or by a pure parental preference for sons.
In practice, if migration is costly and not all children are in the position to migrate, a
pro-son migration bias may lead to a situation in which children compete for household
resources in order to migrate and such ‘rivalry’ can yield gains to having relatively more
sisters than brothers (Garg and Morduch, 1998). Thus, in order to explore the scope
of sibling rivalry by gender, we test how sibling composition influences child migration
investment by running two sets of regressions as reported in Table 2.7. First, we estimate
migration equations with family and birth order fixed effects (i.e., conditioning on both
family size and birth order) on the full sample of children as a function of the number
of their older brothers, while controlling for the number of older siblings, and child’s age
(linear and squared). Results in column (1) show that, ceteris paribus, while the number
of older siblings does not significantly affect the likelihood to migrate, having an older
brother (sister) instead of an older sister (brother) decreases (increases) the migration
probability by 1.4 p.p. (t = 3.6). This result points to a significant role of the gender
and age composition of siblings in children’s migration outcomes, which does not differ
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significantly by the child’s gender (column 2).
We further exploit the gendered migration pattern and the fact that siblings are likely
to migrate in order of birth (with higher parities being less likely to migrate, as shown
by our former estimates in section 5.1) to test the hypothesis of parental son preference.
We do so by including a control for having a next-born brother in the family fixed effects
regressions on the pooled-sample (with and without interactive effects), as above. If a child
has at least one younger sibling, the gender of his/her next-born sibling is random and
a comparison of children with next-born brothers with children with next-born sisters,
while controlling for older siblings composition, can identify the effect of the sibling’s
gender.32 Results in columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.7 show that, conditional on older
siblings’ composition, having a next-born brother does not play any role for sons, but
reduces the likelihood to migrate for girls with respect to boys by 1.2 p.p. (t = −2). This
result suggests that when parents decide the level of investment in their children’s out-
migration, the siblings’ composition by gender and age matters. More specifically, from
our results it seems that a daughter with a next-born brother may be less likely to migrate
than a girl with a next-born sister. In other words, when parents face the decision whether
to send a daughter abroad, they seem to prefer to invest in the migration of her next-
born brother. Consistent with this explanation, when looking at sample raw statistics,
the average migration rate of daughters’ next-born brothers and next-born sisters are
7 percent and 3 percent respectively. These results are in line with other evidence from
developing countries that, when there are high returns to investing in the human capital of
children but resources are limited, children may become rivals (even in the absence of any
explicit strategic behavior on the part of any family member) and typically girls turns out
to be disadvantaged when they compete with boys. (Dunn and Plomin, 1990; Kristin and
Anne, 1994; Morduch, 2000). Indeed, our findings are suggestive that children, especially
girls, with relatively more brothers than sisters are less likely to migrate abroad than their
peers.
These results, combined with the birth order effects reported above, are consistent with
the argument that a low-parity Mexican boy may be more valuable to send as a migrant
abroad than a girl. Indeed, labor market returns for Mexican boys in the U.S. were
relatively higher in the 1990s (e.g., in the farm sector). In addition, the opportunity cost
of sending girls abroad may be higher because they usually take care of chores and family
32A similar empirical strategy has been used in Vogl (2013) to study sibling rivalry over arranged
marriages in South Asia.
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duties at home or are in charge of being close to parents in their elderly age. Hence,
social norms or practices combined with market returns on the migration investment
may explain the pro-male biased pattern of mass Mexico-U.S. migration and document,
similarly to other developing contexts, that young females tend to have less access to
human capital investment and enhancing economic opportunities than it is the case for
males.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper we provide novel and rigorous evidence on the extent to which international
labor mobility is affected by the demographic conditions of the migrant’s household.
Migration is largely a youth phenomenon occurring in households which ever dispatch
all of their children to work abroad. The ‘resource dilution’ hypothesis predicts that with
larger sibship size, children’s migration rates fall. Yet, in poor contexts, parents are likely
to depend on their grown up children for the provision of care and income, and high rates
of migration can significantly contribute money to old-age parents’ living arrangements.
We use a rich household-survey dataset on teenagers and young adults to examine the
causal effects of sibship size, birth order and sibling composition on migration outcomes
in Mexico. Mexican migration, mainly to the U.S., is an enduring flow accounting for one
third of total U.S. immigration and one-tenth of the entire population born in Mexico.
Importantly, migration patterns differ by age and gender, with a significant fraction of
Mexican males migrating in the age between 15 and 30.
We focus on the determinants of migration of adolescents and young adults in Mexico.
Our large dataset allows us to overcome limitations of small samples of children and in-
cludes detailed information on both women’s fertility and household members’ migration
histories. We find little evidence that fertility has a causal impact on migration. The
positive correlation between fertility and migration disappears when the potential endo-
geneity of sibship size is addressed using biological fertility and infertility shocks. On
the other hand, we find differences in the chance to migrate between siblings within the
same family (sibling rivalry). Older siblings, especially firstborn males, are more likely to
migrate, while having relatively more sisters than brothers systematically increases the
likelihood to migrate. Moreover, girls are less likely to migrate when their next parity is
a male. This is consistent with the argument that, in scarce-resource contexts, girls can
be seen as more economically and socially costly to parents, so that boys end up having
more economic opportunities than girls even through migration.
Our findings adds to the migration literature by shedding new light on the role of the
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family in determining international migration choices. Labor mobility, especially from
poor to rich settings, is one of the most important ways through which young adults can
expand their human capital and earning potentials. The type of family-based migration
from Mexico to the U.S. during the 1990s is of substantial and growing importance for
many other developing countries (e.g. in Asia and Africa) currently affected by both high
fertility and international migration (e.g., Hatton and Williamson, 2003). Despite the
easy to see association between fertility rates and migration, we provide evidence that
large families are unlikely to be a systematic driver of migration. This is in line with
other recent findings that show high fertility in developing contexts is not necessarily bad
for children’s economic outcomes (e.g., Qian, 2009). In terms of policy, understanding
the link between fertility and migration is especially relevant today as many governments
in developing countries have attempted to curb population growth as a way of increasing
average human capital investment and possibly reduce migration (e.g., China and India,
the world’s two most populous countries, have experimented with different family planning
policy first to control family size). Yet, while our empirical findings do not point to a
causal link between fertility and migration, they hint to the fact that parental investment
in offspring’s migration may matter for lifetime fertility choices. This is so as in a context
of poor resources and weak safety net institutions, children may be a key social security
valve for parents such that high migration opportunities to rich countries increase the
value of having children. Hence, effective social safety nets (such as old age pensions) or
even the development of credit and insurance markets could lead to a reduction in both
migration and fertility, and perhaps also to less bias against girls.
60 Chapter 2. Family Size, Sibling Rivalry and Migration: Evidence from Mexico
2.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Mexican individual (non-tied) migration by age and gender
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Source: Our computations on ENADID, 1992 and 1997.
Figure 2.2: Individual migration rate by sibship size
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Source: Our computations on ENADID, 1992 and 1997.
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Figure 2.3: Ratio of migrant children by sibship size
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Source: Our computations on ENADID, 1992 and 1997 (subsample of households with migrants).
Figure 2.4: Cumulative number of children by women’s infertility shock status
3
4
5
6
7
8
No
. o
f li
ve
 b
irt
hs
25 30 35 40
Women's age
 Infertile  Fertile
Note. Source: ENADID, 1992 and 1997. This figure reports the total (cumulative) number of live births
by women’s infertility shock status and age (it refers to women belonging to different birth cohorts).
Regression lines are super-imposed to the cross-plot.
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Figure 2.5: Cumulative number of children by women’s miscarriage at first pregnancy
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Note. Source: ENADID, 1992 and 1997. This figure reports the total (cumulative) number of live
births by miscarriage at first pregnancy and age (it refers to women belonging to different birth cohorts).
Regression lines are super-imposed to the cross-plot.
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Table 2.1: Individual sample characteristics by migration status
Non-migrants Migrants P-values
Age 18.878 20.982 0.000
Female 0.458 0.250 0.000
N. of siblings 5.071 5.869 0.000
Birth order 1 0.181 0.192 0.300
Birth order 2 0.231 0.225 0.555
Birth order 3 0.178 0.178 0.978
Birth order 4 0.137 0.154 0.077
Birth order 5 0.102 0.102 0.993
Birth order 6 0.071 0.073 0.781
Birth order 7 0.046 0.041 0.343
Birth order 8 0.028 0.021 0.100
Birth order 9 0.014 0.009 0.121
Birth order 10+ 0.011 0.006 0.107
Mother’s age 44.847 46.065 0.000
Mother’s age at first preg-
nancy
20.025 19.554 0.000
Mother’s years of schooling 3.953 3.286 0.000
Mother chronic illness 0.022 0.017 0.203
Single mother 0.176 0.220 0.000
Mother’s labor income 552.094 775.354 0.000
Father’s age 38.745 19.605 0.000
Father’s years of schooling 3.683 1.328 0.000
Father’s labor income 2,011.533 3,135.883 0.000
Observations 25,349 1,394
Note. Source: ENADID, 1992 and 1997. The estimation sample includes individuals aged 15–25 whose
mothers are not using contraceptive methods or never did.
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Table 2.2: Birth order effects
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
female -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.031***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
birth order -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.003) (0.003)
birth order × female -0.001
(0.001)
birth order 2 -0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.006)
birth order 3 -0.021*** -0.023***
(0.007) (0.008)
birth order 4 -0.038*** -0.034***
(0.010) (0.011)
birth order 5 -0.068*** -0.070***
(0.013) (0.014)
birth order 6 -0.086*** -0.077***
(0.016) (0.017)
birth order 7 -0.112*** -0.103***
(0.019) (0.020)
birth order 8 -0.136*** -0.140***
(0.022) (0.023)
birth order 9 -0.161*** -0.166***
(0.026) (0.028)
birth order 10+ -0.199*** -0.188***
(0.030) (0.033)
birth order 2, female -0.011
(0.009)
birth order 3, female 0.005
(0.010)
birth order 4, female -0.010
(0.010)
birth order 5, female 0.006
(0.011)
birth order 6, female -0.018
(0.012)
birth order 7, female -0.017
(0.015)
birth order 8, female 0.010
(0.018)
birth order 9, female 0.012
(0.024)
birth order 10+, female -0.022
(0.027)
age 0.020** 0.021** 0.020** 0.021**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year of birth indicators YES YES YES YES
Family fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 26,743 26,743 26,743 26,743
Number of households 10,139 10,139 10,139 10,139
R-squared 0.050 0.052 0.050 0.053
Note. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of the child’s migration status. The model is
estimated using OLS. Sibship size is absorbed by family fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
household level in parentheses. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level,
respectively.
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Table 2.3: Sibship size effect: WLS estimates
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
N. siblings 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N. siblings × female(a) -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
female -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.031***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Individual’s controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mother’s controls NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Father’s controls NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Municipality indicators NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 26,743 26,743 26,743 26,743 26,743 26,743 26,743
R-squared 0.013 0.054 0.055 0.177 0.178 0.202 0.203
Note. The dependent variable is netted migration (see Section 2.4). The model is estimated using
Weighted Least Squares (WLS), in which weights are the inverse of the standard errors of netted migration.
Individual’s controls include year of birth indicators, age, age squared; mother’s controls include year of
birth indicators, age and age squared, age at first pregnancy, years of schooling, indicators for mother’s
chronic illness and being single; father’s controls include decade of birth indicators, age and age squared,
years of schooling. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. (a) The number of
siblings is demeaned before taking the interaction. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5
and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Sibliship size effect: 2SLS estimates
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Second stage
N. siblings 0.004 -0.018 -0.005
(0.014) (0.023) (0.012)
female -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IV: infertility miscarriage overidentified
Anderson-Rubin F−statistic 0.0734 0.686 0.389
[0.787] [0.407] [0.678]
Hansen J−statistic 0.737
[0.391]
First stage — N. siblings
infertility -0.494*** -0.491***
(0.095) (0.095)
miscarriage -0.437*** -0.433***
(0.10) (0.10)
Angrist-Pischke F−statistic instrument(s) 26.90 19.13 23.37
Individual’s controls YES YES YES
Mother’s controls YES YES YES
Father’s controls YES YES YES
Municipality indicators YES YES YES
Observations 26,743 26,743 26,743
Note. The dependent variable is netted migration (see Section 2.4). Observations are weighted by the
inverse of the standard error of netted migration. Individual’s controls include year of birth indicators,
age, age squared; mother’s controls include year of birth indicators, age and age squared, age at first
pregnancy, years of schooling, indicators for mother’s chronic illness and being single; father’s controls
include decade of birth indicators, age and age squared, years of schooling. Standard errors clustered at
the household level in parentheses. P−values are reported in brackets. *,** and *** denote statistical
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Child gender and sibliship size effect: 2SLS estimates
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Second stage
N. siblings 0.005 -0.065 -0.007
(0.016) (0.048) (0.015)
N. siblings × female(a) -0.005 0.112 0.005
(0.013) (0.079) (0.013)
female -0.032*** -0.064*** -0.034***
(0.004) (0.022) (0.005)
IV: infertility miscarriage overidentified
Anderson-Rubin F−statistic 0.0744 2.210 1.150
[0.928] [0.110] [0.331]
Hansen J−statistic 4.399
[0.111]
First stage — N. siblings
infertility -0.567*** -0.564***
(0.109) (0.108)
infertility × female 0.168 0.169
(0.115) (0.115)
miscarriage -0.453*** -0.450***
(0.117) (0.117)
miscarriage × female 0.037 0.038
(0.106) (0.105)
Angrist-Pischke F−statistic instrument(s) 28.62 11.98 15.68
First stage — N. siblings × female
infertility 0.125*** 0.125***
(0.038) (0.038)
infertility × female -0.694*** -0.691***
(0.131) (0.131)
miscarriage -0.067 -0.068
(0.044) (0.043)
miscarriage × female -0.261** -0.254*
(0.131) (0.130)
Angrist-Pischke F−statistic instrument(s) 26.93 4.27 13.83
Individual’s controls YES YES YES
Mother’s controls YES YES YES
Father’s controls YES YES YES
Municipality indicators YES YES YES
Observations 26,743 26,743 26,743
Note. The dependent variable is netted migration (see Section 2.4). Observations are weighted by the
inverse of the standard error of netted migration. Individual’s controls include year of birth indicators,
age, age squared; mother’s controls include year of birth indicators, age and age squared, age at first
pregnancy, years of schooling, indicators for mother’s chronic illness and being single; father’s controls
include decade of birth indicators, age and age squared, years of schooling. Standard errors clustered
at the household level in parentheses. P−values are reported in brackets. (a) The number of siblings
is demeaned before taking the interaction. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1
percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Sibship size effect: Household-level estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Second stage
N. children 0.012*** -0.001 -0.014 -0.005
(0.001) (0.013) (0.022) (0.011)
IV: — infertility miscarriage overidentified
Anderson-Rubin F−statistic 0.006 0.400 0.203
[0.940] [0.527] [0.816]
Hansen J−statistic 0.265
[0.607]
First stage — N. children
infertility -0.643*** -0.640***
(0.063) (0.063)
miscarriage -0.442*** -0.438***
(0.070) (0.070)
Angrist-Pischke F−statistic instrument(s) 103.87 39.81 72.40
Mother’s controls YES YES YES YES
Father’s controls YES YES YES YES
Municipality indicators YES YES YES YES
Observations 17,544 17,544 17,544 17,544
Note. The dependent variable is a dummy for the child’s migration status. Mother’s controls include year
of birth indicators, age and age squared, age at first pregnancy, years of schooling, indicators for mother’s
chronic illness and being single; father’s controls include decade of birth indicators, age and age squared,
years of schooling. P−values are reported in brackets. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10,
5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Siblings’ composition effect: OLS estimates
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
N. older brothers -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
N. older siblings -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
female -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.014**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
N. older brothers × female 0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
N. older siblings × female -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
next brother -0.005 0.000
(0.003) (0.004)
next brother × female -0.012**
(0.006)
Age, age squared YES YES YES YES
Birth order fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year of birth indicators YES YES YES YES
Family fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 26,743 26,743 26,743 26,743
Number of hid 10,139 10,139 10,139 10,139
R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053
Note. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of the child’s migration status. The model is
estimated using OLS. Sibship size is absorbed by family fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
household level in parentheses. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level,
respectively.
Chapter 3
The effect of immigrants’ voting right:
evidence from a natural experiment
3.1 Introduction
During the last decades, immigration to European countries has increased exponentially,
contributing to the creation of more ethnically heterogenous societies. Together with
the increase in immigrants, politics in Europe has taken a rightward turn, driven by the
success of nationalist and anti immigrants parties. Among scholars, it has risen questions
about the relationship between ethnic diversity and political and economic outcomes. The
main hyphotesis addressed by the existing literature concerns with the effect of the mere
presence of immigrants and the increasing ethnic diversity on policy outcomes, through
the changes in native voters’ political attitudes and voting behavior. The contribution of
this paper is to show how political and economic outcomes change as a consequence of an
increase in political power of ethnic minorities, given by the extension of voting rights to
immigrants of non EU origin.
Belgium recently extended the right to vote in local elections to immigrants from
outside the European Union with at least five years of legal residence in the country. The
act providing for non citizen voting was adopted by the Belgian Parliament as the Law
of 19 March 2004, and went into effect in 2006. This natural experiment is exploited here
to study how the new group of enfranchised affects political outcomes at municipal level,
by looking at electoral results for 589 municipalities during the period 1988-2012.
Since the 70s, extending the right to vote to immigrants in local elections has been a
sensitive issue of the political debate in Europe. Non-citizens’ active political participa-
tion is widely recognized as a stimulating factor for immigrants’ integration in the host
society. Supporters of the expansion of voting rights claim that all residents who pay
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taxes, contribute to the social security and take part at the community life should have
the right to contribute to the selection of representatives. On the other hand, there is
a common fear that immigrants’ votes could tilt the political balance with potentially
unfavorable outcomes for natives, e.g. with respect to the level of redistribution. In Bel-
gium, Flemish politicians were the most resistant to the enfranchisement of immigrants,
arguing that the introduction of a new group of voters would shatter the delicate balance
of power between Dutch and French-speaking communities and possibly create a dispro-
portionate benefit for Francophone political parties. Behind anecdotal evidence, there is
very little systematic evidence on the socio-economic consequences of enfranchisement of
immigrants. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by exploiting the 2004 Belgian law.
This paper relates to two strands of literature. The first one takes a political econ-
omy approach and examines the effects of the extension of voting rights on the size of
government (Husted and Kenny, 1997; Lott, 1999; Cascio and Washington, 2014). The
main message from this literature is that the enfranchisement of minorities (e.g. black,
poorer or women) determines an increase in welfare or government expenditures, mainly
driven by the change of the median voter. The second strand of literature examines the
relationship between the mere presence of immigrants (and immigration-driven increases
in ethnic diversity) and natives’ voting behavior or political attitudes (Razin et al., 2002;
Bo¨heim and Mayr, 2005; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Harmon, 2013; Barone et al., 2014; Mayda
et al., 2015). The negative relationship between ethnic diversity and left-wing political
preferences, as well as the level of public spending at local level, is confirmed in most
studies.
Belgium is an interesting setting to study the impact of enfranchising non citizens
of non Eu origin. First, Belgium has historically attracted significant immigration flows
and the number of immigrants has steadily increased since the 80s. Second, according
to the Belgian Constitution, local governments can take any initiatives that is beneficial
to local interests and no other government has legal responsibility for the concerned
field of action. Local governments have great autonomy and responsibility on a number
of important issues, including expenditures on education, security and social policies,
culture, urbanism and environment. It suggests that local politics is the relevant decision
making level for many aspects of life. Moreover, Belgium is a country of different linguistic
and political realities. The three regions of the Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels differ
in many dimensions, including political preferences and immigration policy (see Section
3.2.1). These differences offer the opportunity to explore heterogeneous effects of the 2004
Law and can provide key insights on the interpretation of the results.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the institutional setting of Belgium is
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discussed; Section 3 presents data and the empirical strategy; in Section 4 results of the
empirical analysis are presented; Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Institutional setting of Belgium
Specific features of the Belgian immigration policy and political system are particularly
relevant for the empirical analysis. This section gives a brief overview of these two aspects
of the Belgian context.
3.2.1 The Belgian immigration policy
In Belgium, competencies over immigration issues are split between the federal state and
the regions. The federal state is responsible for admissions, removals, residence rights and
laws on citizenship of immigrants; while regional authorities have jurisdiction over ‘the
reception and integration of immigrants’, by promoting their participation in the host
society (as established by the law of 8 August 1980).
The regions of Flanders and Wallonia adopted very different immigrants’ integration
policies, inspired by diverse values and pursuing contrasting objectives. It results in immi-
grants having different rights and duties, according to their place of residence. Flanders’
policy highlights the importance of cultural diversity and ethnic identities and combines
an assimilationist policy targeting new comers with a multicultural policy addressed to
established ethic minority groups. A large network of implementing actors, coordinated
by a centralized organization, administers language courses and a civic integration course
(focusing on rules and regulations, common norms and values), as part of the compulsory
integration trajectories. Importantly, non attendance of the courses is punished by the
means of an administrative fine.
The Francophone Belgium, instead, puts emphasis on economic and social inclusion
and promotes it through color-blind policies, as a good strategy to promote assimilation,
opposite to targeted or multiculturalist policies, responsible for stressing differences among
natives and immigrants. The Walloon integration process is very decentralized, and most
of the initiatives promoting integration are taken at municipality level and implemented
by local organizations. Immigrants are not obliged to attend integration courses and the
the total budget devoted to integration policy is much lower in Wallonia with respect to
Flanders (Adam and Jacobs, 2014).
The region of Brussels combines together Flemish and Francophone integration poli-
cies, led by local organizations, mainly in poor and deprived neighborhoods.
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Another relevant difference at regional level concern parties’ position regarding im-
migration and immigrants’ rigths. On the one hand, Francophone political parties are
willing to promote naturalization as a natural mean for foreigners’ integration; on the
other, Flemish parties claim the importance of integration before naturalization and ask
for a stricter immigration policy.
3.2.2 The Belgian political system
The Belgian electoral system is divided according to linguistic lines: Flemish parties
compete for votes in the region of Flanders, while Francophone parties run in the region
of Wallonia. Only in the region of Brussels there are both parties. During the 70s the
major statewide parties split along regional lines, and all parties created after that are
organized at community level and only represent the interest of part of the population.
The Belgian political system can then be classified as a two party systems (Dandoy, 2014).
Immigration is a relevant issue in the electoral platforms of Belgian parties, and it has
been highly politicized. It allows labeling and ranking parties according to their position
on immigration issues. The attitudes of local parties toward immigration is recovered
by looking at the manifestos of their national counterparts; more specifically, by looking
at the analysis conducted by Dandoy (2014), who studied the electoral platforms of the
main Belgian national parties between 1977 and 2007. Belgian local politics is highly
nationalized, with many national parties taking part at local elections. It happens more
in Flanders than the Walloon and Brussels regions. As Figure 3.1 reveal, for the local
elections in the period 1988-2012, in Flanders, more than 80% of the votes was gained by
parties with a national counterparts (or parties that can be labeled as belonging to one
major party family with a national counterpart); the share is much lower (about 40%) in
the other two regions, where municipal elections still remain more ‘localized’, i.e. there
are many local party with no national counterparts running for elections.
Many significant aspects come out from the analysis of national parties’ political man-
ifestos and allow constructing a rank of parties over immigration attitudes. First, it
emerges that, overall, Flemish parties allocate more attention to immigration than Fran-
cophone parties. Second, as expected, extreme right parties’ manifestos dedicate more
space to immigration issues than other parties, with an exception. When looking at each
single election in the period 1977-2007, it emerges that during the 90s the Flemish liberal
party focused on the issue of immigration more than any other parties. Third, by look-
ing at a specific policy sector of immigration, namely immigration integration, it appears
that extreme-right and liberal parties dedicate more attention to the issue with respect to
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socialist and Christian Democrat parties. Last, when looking at the specific issues of the
migration debate a clear pattern emerges in both regions: while Christian Democrat and
socialist parties give more space to the discussion of democracy and rights, including the
debate on voting rights; extreme-right and liberal parties focus on law and order, with
special emphasis on the relation between immigrants and crime and the implications for
public order. Given these elements of the parties’ manifestos, main parties taking part at
local election are ranked from very-pro to very-anti immigrants parties.
3.3 Data and methods
Data come from multiple sources. As for the outcomes variables, the focus is on both
election results and expenditures at municipal level. Data on five election rounds results
(1988,1994 2000 before the reform and 2006, 2012 after the reform) have been collected
from the web, using Python. The regional authorities of Flanders provided data on
municipal expenditures and revenues at local level (for the period 2003-2013).
The Ministry of Interior released data on potential and registered non Eu voters for
local elections in 2006 and 2012. Data on the characteristics of the Belgian municipalities
over time are (mainly) available online through the Statistics Belgium.
Table 3.1 shows the share of potential non Eu non citizens voters measured in 2006
and 2012 elections. Interestingly, this share has increased over time, above all in Flanders.
Moreover, it is important to notice that potential non Eu voters do not spread equally
across regions: the municipalities of the Brussels region have a much higher share, while
Flanders and Wallonia have a smaller and similar share of non Eu potential voters.
3.3.1 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy exploits two sources of variation: the first is time variation coming
from the introduction of the reform; the second source of variation is cross-sectional and
arises from the differences in municipalities’ share of non Eu immigrants allowed to vote.
In the spirit of a differences-in-differences strategy, election results of municipalities with
more immigrants entitled to vote are compared with municipalities with a smaller share
of immigrant voters (intensity of the treatment), before and after the reform.
The introduction of municipality and time-period fixed effects controls for all time-
invariant differences across municipalities and secular changes over time. The strategy
relies on the absence of any other shocks occurred around the same time the reform
was introduced and correlated with the share of potential immigrant voters. The latter
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identification concern is addressed by controlling for time and municipality-varying factors
that may bias the estimates, such as population density, population size (in logarithmic
form) and the share of foreign population. In addition, controls for turnout and a dummy
for winning incumbent are added.
The paper focuses on the identification of the parameter δ in equation 3.1 below:
ymt = α + ηm + γt + δTm ∗ postt + βXmt + mt (3.1)
where ymt is an electoral (or economic) outcomes, ηm is a municipality fixed effect, γt an
election (or year, depending on having a political or economic outcome) fixed effect, Tm is
the fraction of non Eu non citizens allowed to vote, as it is measured in 2006 (the variable
that captures the treatment intensity) and Xmt includes a set of time-varying municipal
characteristics, as listed above.
The availability of two or more pre- and post-treatment period allows to estimate
a flexible model that includes leads and lags of the treatment. This allows to assess
the presence of anticipatory effects or other violations of the common trend assumption.
Formally, the model in equation 3.2 below is estimated:
ymt = α + ηm + γt +
T∑
j=t+1
δjTm ∗ Ijt + βXmt + mt (3.2)
where everything is defined as above, with the exception that the effect of the treatment
is identified in each election going from t+1 to T (with t being the reference category).
Equation 3.2 imposes no parametric assumptions on the pre-treatment dynamics and
allows for a the test of the null hypothesis of no common pre-treatment trends (H0 : δj = 0
for all pre-treatment periods). Moreover, it also allows the implementation of tests on the
dynamics of the treatment effect, i.e, it is possible to test whether the effect is constant
in the post-treatment period.
3.4 Results
This section presents the results of the effect of the reform on political and economic
outcomes, by region. For what concerns political outcomes, first, all ranked parties are
considered, then the analysis will focus on outcomes for which the reform was effective.
76Chapter 3. The effect of immigrants’ voting right: evidence from a natural experiment
3.4.1 Flanders
Table 3.2 show results on the share of votes taken by each family of parties in Flanders.
The reform significantly affects only the pro-immigrant party in the region, which is
losing power in the post reform period. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that
an increase of 1 p.p. (percentage point) in the treatment determines a decrease of more
than 3 p.p. in the share of votes to the pro-immigrant party. There are no significant
results on the outcomes of the other parties.
From now on, the focus will be on the share of votes to the pro-immigrant party.
In order to give a causal interpretation to the effect of the reform, municipalities with
different intensity of the treatment must have similar pre reform trend in the outcome
variable. This hypothesis can be tested by estimating a fully flexible model, as expressed
in equation 3.2. Results of the flexible estimates for Flanders are reported in Table 3.3.
In all columns, the coefficients associated to the pre-treatment periods are small and
non significantly different from zero; while there is a negative and increasing (in absolute
value) effect in the post treatment election rounds. As shown in column (6), this result is
also robust to the inclusion of district specific time trend. Figure 3.2 plots the coefficients
of the interactions between the intensity of the treatment and each election’s dummies,
as reported in column (6). There is a zero and flat effect before the 2004 reform and a
negative and significant effect starting from 2006 election.
In Table 3.4 equation 3.1 is estimated by using a restricted sample, accounting only
for 1988 to 2000 elections. In this subsample a placebo effect of the reform is estimated,
by assuming that the reform took place in 1994 or 2000. Given that the reform was
effective only for the 2006 election onwards, finding significant effects in 1994 or 2000
elections would suggest violations of the identifying assumptions, since they could not be
attributed to the real reform. Conversely, finding no effects on this subsample suggest
that the baseline estimates can be interpreted as causal. In column (1) of Table 3.4 the
sample is restricted to three rounds of election, and the treatment is imposed in 1994
and 2000. In column (2) only elections in 1988 and 1994 are used and 1994 is used as a
fake post treatment period. In column (3) only elections in 1994 and 2000 are considered
and 2000 is the post reform period. The coefficients of the interaction between the post
dummy and the treatment intensity are always much smaller than in Table 3.2 and they
are never significantly different from zero. The placebo experiments suggest no evidence
of a differential relationship between share of votes to the pro-immigration party and the
treatment intensity in the pre reform elections.
If voting behavior reflects voters’ demand for public goods, changes in municipalities’
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expenditures and revenues should be expected as a consequence of the changes in parties’
share of votes. In the case of Flanders, given that pro immigrants parties also favor
more redistribution, less public expenditures and revenues are expected as a result of
the reducing power of the pro-immigration parties. Results in Table 3.5 confirm this
expectations and show that municipalities with a higher treatment experience a higher
decrease in total and welfare per capita expenditures and per capita revenues in the post
reform period.
3.4.2 Brussels
Table 3.6 reports results of the estimation of equation 3.1 for the 19 municipalities of the
Brussels region. The enfranchisement of non citizens of non Eu origin has a negative effect
on the share of votes of the pro immigration parties, that loses about 1 p.p. of votes as
the treatment intensity increases by 1 p.p.
However, a deeper analysis of this effect, as shown by the fully flexible estimates in
Table 3.7 points to no evidence of a casual effect of the reform. Specifically, even if the
post reform coefficients are negative and bigger (in absolute value) than the pre reform
coefficients, they are not statistically significant.
3.4.3 Wallonia
When looking at the results for the region of Wallonia, an opposite effect of the reform with
respect to Flanders emerges: the very pro-immigrants’s parties gain votes in municipalities
where the share of potential non Eu voters is higher. More precisely, an increase of 1 p.p.
in the treatment determines an increase of almost 3 p.p in the share of votes to the very
pro-immigrant parties.
In order to interpret causally the previous result, there should be no violation of the
common trend assumption. The fully flexible estimates, reported in Table 3.9 point to
similar pre reform trends in the outcome variable: the interacted coefficients are never
significantly different from zero in the pre-reform elections. The main effect for Wallonia
comes from the second election after the reform: in 2012 an increases of 1 p.p. in the
share of immigrant potential voters determines an increase in the share of votes to the very
pro-immigrants parties of more than 5 p.p.. Figure 3.3 reports the interacted coefficients
from column (6) in table 3.9, for a better visual inspection of the effect.
The placebo experiments for Wallonia are reported in Table 3.10. As for Flanders,
only a subsample of elections is considered and the treatment is imposed in the pre
reform period. The coefficients of the interaction between the dummy post and the
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treatment intensity are never significantly different from zero, pointing to a non differential
relationship between share of votes to the very pro-immigrants party and the treatment
intensity in the pre reform elections.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper studies the effect of granting non citizens of non Eu origin with the right
to vote in local elections on political and economic outcomes. The introduction of a
reform in Belgium in 2004 is exploited as an exogenous variation, allowing for a causal
interpretation of the results.
Results point to an opposite effect of the reform in the region of Flanders and Wallonia:
while in the former the main effect is a decrease in the votes for the pro-immigrants parties
and, consequently, a reduction in welfare expenditures and total revenues; in the latter
the reform determines an increase of votes to the left and pro immigrants parties 1. The
magnitude of the effects, if compared with the small group of new voters, suggests that
the law generates a reaction in natives’ voting behavior.
As discussed in section 3.2.1, Flanders and Wallonia pursue very different immigration
policies and have an opposite attitude toward immigration. Moreover, the two regions
are characterized by a very different economic and demographic context (Dandoy, 2014):
compared to Wallonia, Flanders are a more prosperous economy, with no need of immi-
grant workers. These differences might explain the results: the rich Flanders have stronger
(negative) ethnic preferences and care less about public good, then natives vote less for
the pro immigrants and pro public good parties.
Most of the existing literature studying the political effect of migration in Europe
focuses on the impact of the mere presence of immigrants on natives’ local behavior. The
main contribution of this paper is to show that a big natives’ changes in voting behavior
comes from the enfranchisement of an ethnically different group. The opposite results on
the two regions suggest that enfranchisement per se has not necessarily positive effects
for immigrants: if they are a small and non-integrated group, as in the case of Flanders,
the reaction of natives, who support less the pro immigrants parties, result in a decrease
in the demand public goods, that mostly hurts the low income population, including
immigrants.
1Results in the region of Brussels do not allow for a causal interpretation of the reform effect.
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Figure 3.1: Share of local parties labelled according to their national counterparts
0
20
40
60
80
Flanders Brussels Wallonia
1988 1994 2000 2006 2012 1988 1994 2000 2006 2012 1988 1994 2000 2006 2012
Figure 3.2: Interacted coefficients from fully flexible estimates: Flanders
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Figure 3.3: Interacted coefficients from fully flexible estimates: Wallonia
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Table 3.1: Potential non citizens non Eu voters as a percentage of all other voters
2006 2012 Difference
Belgium 0.6% 0.79% 32%
Flanders 0.41% 0.62% 51%
Wallonia 0.46% 0.59% 28%
Brussels 5.42% 6.06% 11%
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Table 3.2: Effect of immigrants’ enfranchisement: Flanders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very pro-imm Pro-imm Anti-imm Very anti-imm
Treatment×Post 0.264 -3.225** 0.999 -0.246
(1.372) (1.364) (1.349) (1.074)
Share of Foreigners 0.096 -0.143 -0.437 0.782**
(0.216) (0.424) (0.280) (0.327)
Log of population 6.586 2.251 44.309*** -3.929
(11.754) (17.266) (16.270) (13.599)
Population Density -0.000 0.001 -0.003** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Turnout 0.074 0.645** 0.343 0.089
(0.163) (0.291) (0.298) (0.219)
Winning Incumbent 0.997* 1.988** 0.605 -0.835
(0.530) (0.822) (0.730) (0.625)
Observations 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536
R-squared 0.815 0.809 0.743 0.740
Municipalities’ indicators YES YES YES YES
Years of elections’ indicators YES YES YES YES
District Time Trend YES YES YES YES
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: Fully Flexible Estimates Results: Flanders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pro-imm Pro-imm Pro-imm Pro-imm Pro-imm Pro-imm
Share of foreigners -0.327 -0.341 -0.298 -0.296 -0.141
(0.336) (0.332) (0.336) (0.328) (0.434)
Log of population 9.660 10.785 -1.861
(15.654) (15.674) (18.574)
Population density -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Turnout 0.720** 0.688** 0.576*
(0.290) (0.295) (0.309)
Winning Incumbent 2.361*** 1.965**
(0.778) (0.818)
Treatment×1994 -0.718 -0.646 -0.530 -0.391 0.004 -0.747
(1.347) (1.343) (1.368) (1.354) (1.344) (1.460)
Treatment×2000 -0.779 -0.813 -0.632 -0.506 -0.117 -1.385
(1.111) (1.104) (1.152) (1.117) (1.174) (1.477)
Treatment×2006 -1.955* -2.229* -1.932 -2.569** -2.032* -3.958**
(1.113) (1.168) (1.199) (1.176) (1.225) (1.855)
Treatment×2012 -3.188*** -3.429*** -2.923** -2.797** -2.107 -5.215**
(1.204) (1.243) (1.368) (1.290) (1.384) (2.424)
Observations 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536
R-squared 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.774 0.777 0.809
Municipalities’ indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
Years of elections’ indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Time Trend NO NO NO NO NO YES
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Placebo test: Flanders
]
1988-2000 1988-1994 1994-2000
Post=1994,2000 Post=1994 Post=2000
(1) (2) (3)
Pro-imm Pro-imm Pro-imm
Treatment×Post -0.428 -0.780 -0.314
(1.799) (3.440) (2.663)
Observations 921 614 614
R-squared 0.878 0.930 0.936
Controls YES YES YES
Municipalities’ indicators YES YES YES
Years of elections’ indicators YES YES YES
District Time Trend YES YES YES
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: Expenditures and revenues: Flanders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per capita Per capita Per capita
Log-Expenditures Log-Welfare Expenditures Log-Revenues
Treatment×Post -0.032** -0.419** -0.030**
(0.013) (0.169) (0.015)
Treatment×I round after the law -0.031** -0.421** -0.028*
(0.013) (0.168) (0.015)
Treatment×II round after the law -0.011 -0.443 0.001
(0.022) (0.272) (0.028)
Observations 3,076 3,076 2,748 2,748 3,076 3,076
R-squared 0.773 0.773 0.382 0.382 0.674 0.675
Municipalities’ indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
Years of elections’ indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Time Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Share of foreigners×year YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Time Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Effect of immigrants’ enfranchisement: Brussels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very pro-imm Pro-imm Anti-imm Very anti-imm
Treatment×Post -0.825 -1.168** 2.049 1.448
(0.704) (0.562) (1.416) (1.277)
Share of Foreigners 0.217 -0.739*** 0.809 0.475
(0.342) (0.201) (0.607) (0.480)
Log of population -48.931 26.035 -7.084 -46.905
(61.682) (29.345) (85.156) (49.550)
Population Density 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnout 2.137 0.450 -0.660 0.150
(1.307) (0.434) (1.364) (0.656)
Winning Incumbent 0.777 -2.066 1.351 4.099*
(2.610) (1.418) (4.473) (2.178)
Observations 95 95 95 95
R-squared 0.684 0.696 0.516 0.769
Municipalities’ indicators YES YES YES YES
Years of elections’ indicators YES YES YES YES
District Time Trend YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Fully Flexible Estimates Results: Brussels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pro-imm Pro-imm Pro-imm Pro-imm Pro-imm Pro-imm
Share of foreigners -0.311 -0.338 -0.380 -0.436* -0.656**
(0.241) (0.246) (0.254) (0.259) (0.300)
Log of population -11.342 -1.988 24.680
(22.477) (23.945) (30.567)
Population density -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnout 0.297 0.431 0.373
(0.418) (0.502) (0.521)
Winning incumbent -1.618 -2.148
(1.449) (1.428)
Treatment×1994 0.575 0.492 0.510 0.471 0.451 0.331
(0.458) (0.446) (0.427) (0.436) (0.430) (0.376)
Treatment×2000 1.117*** 0.780 0.852* 0.747 0.726 0.325
(0.395) (0.476) (0.488) (0.507) (0.502) (0.500)
Treatment×2006 1.051** 0.352 0.543 0.299 0.133 -0.736
(0.502) (0.762) (0.765) (0.850) (0.858) (0.968)
Treatment×2012 1.645*** 0.932 1.395* 1.187 1.074 -0.137
(0.431) (0.713) (0.808) (0.925) (0.937) (1.087)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
R-squared 0.573 0.579 0.588 0.590 0.598 0.705
Municipalities’ indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
Years of elections’ indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Time Trend NO NO NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: Effect of immigrants’ enfranchisement: Wallonia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very pro-imm Pro-imm Anti-imm Very anti-imm
Treatment×Post 2.751** -1.537 0.604 -0.463
(1.328) (1.206) (1.420) (0.498)
Share of Foreigners 0.026 0.127 0.263 0.090
(0.516) (0.420) (0.424) (0.157)
Log of population -2.208 -1.530 -10.682 -3.317
(17.279) (8.936) (12.162) (4.805)
Population Density 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Turnout -0.155 -0.036 0.157 0.023
(0.186) (0.119) (0.183) (0.056)
Winning Incumbent -0.874 2.679** -0.645 -0.117
(1.163) (1.104) (1.057) (0.439)
Observations 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,262
R-squared 0.882 0.768 0.788 0.387
Municipalities’ indicators YES YES YES YES
Years of elections’ indicators YES YES YES YES
District Time Trend YES YES YES YES
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9: Fully Flexible Estimates Results: Wallonia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Very Very Very Very Very Very
pro-imm pro-imm pro-imm pro-imm pro-imm pro-imm
Share of foreigners 0.108 0.274 0.213 0.261 0.203
(0.380) (0.423) (0.403) (0.421) (0.583)
Log of population -6.873 -6.813 -0.024
(10.920) (10.930) (17.423)
Population density -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Turnout 0.042 0.052 -0.132
(0.173) (0.177) (0.183)
Winning incumbent -0.840 -0.764
(1.120) (1.171)
Treatment×1994 -0.446 -0.348 -0.390 -0.336 -0.393 -0.191
(0.947) (1.023) (1.071) (1.081) (1.067) (1.183)
Treatment×2000 1.718 1.913 1.610 1.682 1.549 2.289
(1.057) (1.288) (1.391) (1.421) (1.380) (1.692)
Treatment×2006 2.841** 3.177* 3.061 3.157 3.007 3.808
(1.416) (1.769) (1.905) (1.923) (1.882) (2.339)
Treatment×2012 4.742*** 5.092*** 5.182*** 5.464*** 5.130*** 5.536**
(1.357) (1.760) (1.870) (1.889) (1.854) (2.645)
Observations 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,262
R-squared 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.852 0.882
Municipalities’ indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
Years of elections’ indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Time Trend NO NO NO NO NO YES
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.10: Placebo experiments: Wallonia
1988-2000 1988-1994 1994-2000
Post=1994,2000 Post=1994 Post=2000
(1) (2) (3)
Very pro-imm Very pro-imm Very pro-imm
Treatment×Post -0.080 0.598 2.759
(1.572) (2.532) (2.854)
Observations 756 504 504
R-squared 0.937 0.973 0.969
Controls YES YES YES
Municipalities’ indicators YES YES YES
Years of elections’ indicators YES YES YES
District Time Trend YES YES YES
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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